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MORE RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVES*
MICHAEL COENEN**
Courts often fault governments for pursuing their regulatory
interests in an unnecessarily restrictive manner. Indeed, and as is
well appreciated by courts, litigants, and scholars alike, the
availability of a “less restrictive alternative” will often spell the
doom of a constitutionally suspect law. Sometimes, however, this
logic gets flipped on its head, with courts faulting governments
for failing to utilize alternatives that are more restrictive rather
than less. This Article collects examples of what it calls “more
restrictive means” analysis in U.S. constitutional law and
attempts to make sense of its analytical underpinnings.
Specifically, the Article suggests that courts invoke “more
restrictive alternatives” for at least one of two purposes: (a) to
undercut the government’s claim that a regulatory interest
requires it to discriminate in a constitutionally problematic
manner (highlighting what is described as an “equality-based”
defect in the law under review); and/or (b) to cast doubt on the
government’s commitment to a claimed regulatory interest
(highlighting what is described as a “sincerity-based” defect in
the law under review). The Article also analyzes the various types
of defenses the government might raise on behalf of its decision
to regulate less restrictively, such as the claim that a more
restrictive alternative would fail to produce additional regulatory
benefits, the claim that it would increase administrative costs, and
the claim that it would undermine important “lenience-related”
interests that the less restrictive law is better capable of
promoting. Additionally, the Article considers the relationship
between the constitutional import of a more restrictive alternative
and the constitutional validity of the alternative itself, suggesting
somewhat counterintuitively that more restrictive alternatives of
questionable
constitutionality
can
sometimes
support
invalidation of the laws with which they are compared. The
upshot of this analysis is a novel and systematic framework for
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INTRODUCTION
In constitutional law, it is not always true that the ends justify the
means. Although a law’s validity will often depend on the strength of
the government interests said to justify it, courts must also attend to
the question of how the law pursues the interests it purports to
achieve. Constitutional difficulties do not disappear just because a law
happens to connect with a governmental interest that is “legitimate,”
“important,” or even “compelling”; to withstand attack, the law must
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also advance that interest in an appropriate manner. Justifying a law’s
ends amounts to only half of the battle; even where the ends pass
muster, so too must the means.1
How do courts evaluate the means by which a government
pursues a given regulatory interest? One familiar technique, utilized
across a variety of substantive domains, involves so-called “less
restrictive means” analysis.2 The underlying insight is straightforward:
if a challenged law advances a government interest while imposing
constitutional costs on regulated parties, and if an alternative law
could achieve that same interest without imposing those costs, then
the challenged law must go. The existence of a “less restrictive
alternative,” in other words, undercuts the case for upholding the
“more restrictive” approach under review. Even if the relevant
government interest might sometimes justify a sacrifice in the way of
liberty interests, equality interests, structural safeguards, or some
other constitutionally salient value, courts should not countenance
such a sacrifice when a less restrictive alternative stands waiting in the
wings.
To take a simple example, imagine a First Amendment challenge
to a city ordinance that prohibits the holding of outdoor political
rallies within municipal boundaries. Imagine also that city officials
defend the law by reference to a government interest in avoiding
noise and disorder on city streets. Because the ban is a “contentbased” regulation of speech (insofar as it takes aim at only political
rallies), a court is likely to subject this law to strict scrutiny.3 Applying
strict scrutiny, the court is likely to identify several less restrictive
laws that might still allow the city to achieve its peace-promoting
goals. The city might, for instance, prohibit the holding of political
1. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 464–65 (1980) (“For even the most legitimate goal
may not be advanced in a constitutionally impermissible manner.”).
2. For descriptions of the logic underlying “less restrictive means” analysis, see, for
example, Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1326
(2007); David B. Kopel, The First Amendment Guide to the Second Amendment, 81 TENN.
L. REV. 417, 465–66 (2014); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and
Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2422 (1996) [hereinafter Volokh,
Freedom of Speech]; Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right To Keep and Bear Arms for
Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1443, 1465 (2009) [hereinafter
Volokh, Right To Keep and Bear Arms]. Less restrictive means analysis enjoys a strong
foothold in other jurisdictions as well, where courts have incorporated it as a discrete
component of “proportionality”-based rights review. See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum,
Limiting Constitutional Rights, 54 UCLA L. REV. 789, 836–37 (2007); Vicki C. Jackson,
Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094, 3099 (2015); Jud
Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion? American Rights Review and the
Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797, 802–03 (2011).
3. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
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rallies in residential neighborhoods, prohibit political rallies during
weeknights, prohibit political rallies with 100 or more participants,
prohibit only those rallies that are “disorderly,” and so forth. At least
some of these alternatives would achieve tolerable levels of peace and
tranquility for city residents, and all would do so in a manner that
lessens the burden on would-be rally-goers’ free-speech rights. Given
the existence of these less restrictive means, a court would have good
reason to conclude that the city has pursued its interests in an
impermissible way.
Now consider an alternative possibility. Suppose that the city
demonstrates that none of the less restrictive alternatives identified
would achieve a comparable level of peace and quiet on its streets.
Should the city then prevail? Not necessarily. Even with the less
restrictive alternatives disqualified, there remain other sorts of
alternatives that might still compel the law’s invalidation. Specifically,
rather than curtail the restriction imposed by the existing law, the city
might instead expand the restriction, so as to bring even more
expressive conduct within its regulatory reach. One possibility would
entail a ban on political rallies in addition to some other types of
rallies, such as religious rallies and sports-related rallies. Another
possibility would entail a ban on political rallies that occur both
indoors and outdoors. An even broader possibility might involve a
categorical ban on all types of rallies—be they centered on politics,
religion, motorcycles, sports, or any other subject about which large
groups of people come together in support of some cause. Yet
another possibility might be a wholesale ban on assembling in public
areas, regardless of whether the assembling is intended to serve
expressive or non-expressive purposes. Would-be political rally-ers, to
be sure, would fare no better under any of these alternative laws;
rather, the only change would be a worsening of the situation faced by
other individuals who are currently unburdened by the status quo
regime. And yet, at least some of these more restrictive alternatives
might provide a valid reason for invalidating the less restrictive law
under review.
Scholars and practitioners of constitutional law are by no means
unfamiliar with the proposition that expanding a law’s regulatory
burdens (or contracting a law’s regulatory benefits) can sometimes
ameliorate its constitutional defects. Most familiarly, it has long been
recognized that governments may remediate equal protection
problems by “leveling down” a law’s treatment of a currently
advantaged group to align with its treatment of a currently
disadvantaged group. If, after all, discrimination is the relevant
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concern, then a law that treats everyone poorly might prove less
constitutionally problematic than a law that treats some people well.4
This rule has carried force outside the equal protection context as
well. Other doctrines enshrine nondiscrimination principles of their
own, and these principles often support claims that a more restrictive
law poses fewer constitutional problems than its less restrictive
counterpart. Thus, for instance, we might find a dormant Commerce
Clause violation in a law that taxes resident income at ten percent and
nonresident income at fifteen percent, whereas we would not find
such a violation in a law that taxes both resident and nonresident
income at fifteen percent.5 We might find a Free Exercise Clause
violation in a law that prohibits only worshipers from ingesting
peyote, whereas we would not find such a violation in a state that
prohibits both worshipers and non-worshipers from ingesting peyote.6
And we might find a First Amendment violation in a content-based
law that singles out certain types of speech for adverse treatment but
not in a content-neutral law that subjects all forms of that speech to
the same adverse treatment.7 What is true in the equal protection
context thus turns out to be true in other constitutional contexts as
well. “More restrictive” does not always equate to “more
unconstitutional”:
sometimes
governments
can
eliminate

4. See, e.g., Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1806
(2015) (noting that it “is simply a truism about every case under the dormant Commerce
Clause (not to mention the Equal Protection Clause)” that “[w]henever government
impermissibly treats like cases differently, it can cure the violation by . . . ‘leveling
down’”); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 272 (1979) (“In every equal protection attack upon a
statute challenged as underinclusive, the State may satisfy the Constitution’s commands
either by extending benefits to the previously disfavored class or by denying benefits to
both parties (e.g., by repealing the statute as a whole).”); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S.
217, 218–19 (1971) (holding that Jackson, Mississippi did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause when it decided to shut down its racially segregated public swimming pools rather
than open those pools to everyone). For scholarly treatments of the subject, see, for
example, Deborah L. Brake, When Equality Leaves Everyone Worse Off: The Problem of
Leveling Down in Equality Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 515 (2004); Evan H.
Caminker, Note, A Norm-Based Remedial Model for Underinclusive Statutes, 95 YALE L.J.
1185, 1185 (1986); Jean Marie Doherty, Note, Law in an Elevator: When Leveling Down
Remedies Let Equality Off in the Basement, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1017, 1020 (2008).
5. Cf., e.g., Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1822 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that, on the
logic of the majority opinion, “Maryland could eliminate the [constitutional violation] by
terminating the special nonresident tax—a measure that would not help the Wynnes at
all”).
6. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990).
7. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25
WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 205 (1983) (noting that the First Amendment’s content
discrimination principle “may invite government to ‘equalize,’ not by permitting more
speech, but by adopting even more ‘suppressive’ content-neutral restrictions”).
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constitutional problems simply by increasing, rather than decreasing,
the scope of a law’s regulatory burdens.8
But the question posed by the “no political rallies” hypothetical
is not simply whether the government could cure a constitutionally
defective (and less restrictive) law by adopting a more restrictive
alternative in its stead. Rather, the relevant question is whether, and
if so when, the availability of such an alternative should count as a
reason for invalidating the less restrictive law under review. Indeed,
the remedial question of whether the government may ratchet up
restrictiveness in response to an adverse merits-based ruling is distinct
from the substantive question of whether a hypothetically available
more restrictive alternative should produce such an adverse ruling in
the first place.9 It is one thing to highlight a more restrictive
alternative as a permissible substitute for a law whose
8. This point relates to Professor Matthew Adler’s important observation that U.S.
constitutional rights tend to operate as “rule-centered” rather than “act-shielding”
restrictions on government action. See Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral
Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1–173 (1998). As Adler
points out, “[t]o say that sanctioning X pursuant to a particular rule violates her
constitutional rights does not entail that the particular action at stake . . . is
constitutionally protected from being sanctioned pursuant to all other rules.” Id. at 14.
Rather, the statement signifies only that “a reviewing court should at X’s instance
invalidate, in some measure, a particular rule.” Id. It is for this reason, for instance, that
the government can permissibly prosecute an act of flag burning pursuant to a statute that
criminalizes arson but not pursuant to a statute that criminalizes flag burning as such. Id.
at 4–5. If U.S. constitutional law were truly “act-shielding” in its focus, then governments
could never remediate unconstitutional action by increasing the scope of a law’s burdens
(and thus leaving the constitutionally protected act just as unshielded as was previously
the case). But as the foregoing examples demonstrate, the doctrine often permits
governments to do just that. The doctrine’s willingness to permit remediation via
restrictiveness-related increases (in addition to restrictiveness-related decreases) thus
provides strong support for Professor Adler’s descriptive claim about the rule dependent
nature of constitutional rights.
The point also resonates with Professor John Fee’s recent exploration of “greateror-nothing” rules in constitutional law—rules that, as Professor Fee explains, stem from
the proposition that “[t]he power to do A plus B does not necessarily include the power to
do A alone.” See John Fee, Greater-or-Nothing Constitutional Rules, 64 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 101, 102 (2013). As Professor Fee himself notes, some—though by no means all—
such rules stem from the same sorts of doctrinal structures in which more restrictive means
analysis is most likely to be employed. See id. at 109–13. As I explain further below, my
focus here is not on the entire universe of doctrinal rules that permit the government to do
“A plus B” but not “A alone.” Rather, it is on the narrower range of circumstances in
which the government’s failure to do “A plus B” provides a reason to reject its justification
for doing “A alone.” In this sense, I believe that the analysis I provide here usefully
complements Professor Fee’s important and wide-ranging analysis of “greater or lesser”
problems throughout constitutional law, by providing a more focused and in-depth
treatment of one of several ways in which constitutional law might come to allow the
imposition of a “greater” while keeping the “lesser” off limits.
9. See infra Part V.
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unconstitutionality has already been shown, but it is another thing to
leverage such an alternative for the purpose of demonstrating that a
constitutional violation has in fact occurred. If the interests
underlying a law could be equally or better served by worsening the
lot of some regulated parties while improving the lot of no regulated
parties, when (and how) should that fact count as a strike against the
law that the government has chosen to adopt? That, in a nutshell, is
the question that this Article confronts.
The question is worth confronting because more restrictive
means analysis does in fact occur within U.S. constitutional law, as
both the Supreme Court and lower courts have shown receptiveness
to the (sometimes) counterintuitive proposition that the government
can violate the Constitution because it has not regulated restrictively
enough.10 But in so doing, these courts have yet to develop a
systematic framework for understanding (a) the mechanisms by which
a more restrictive alternative might cast doubt on the validity of a less
restrictive law, and (b) the justifications the government might offer
on behalf of its decision not to regulate more restrictively. These
analytical shortcomings in the case law, in turn, have generated spotty
and inconsistent outcomes across cases, whose precedential
implications thus remain vexing and unclear.11 A sustained treatment
of more restrictive means analysis in U.S. constitutional law thus
might help us to make better sense of the existing case law, while also
yielding prescriptive insights for the application of more restrictive
means analysis in future cases.
The descriptive components of this task are carried out in the
first two Parts of the paper. Part I offers definitional details, relating
the notion of constitutional “restrictiveness” to other concepts and
ideas that more often find expression in constitutional doctrine. Part
II goes on to survey existing approaches to more restrictive means
analysis within different areas of the law, demonstrating both (a) the
10. See infra Part II.
11. To be sure, several scholars have addressed aspects of more restrictive means
analysis, although typically in the context of specific areas of substantive doctrine. See, e.g.,
Clay Calvert, Underinclusivity and the First Amendment: The Legislative Right to Nibble at
Problems After Williams-Yulee, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 525, 528 (2016); Richard F. Duncan, Free
Exercise is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi, and the General Applicability
Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 868 (2001) (considering the problem within the
free-exercise context); William E. Lee, The First Amendment Doctrine of Underbreadth,
71 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 637 (1993) (considering various applications of “more restrictive
means” analysis within the free-speech context); Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek,
The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 347–48 (1949) (considering
aspects of the problem within the equal protection context). This Article, by contrast,
represents an attempt to develop a broader, trans-substantive account of the phenomenon.
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wide variety of contexts in which the Court has engaged in more
restrictive means analysis of some form and (b) the absence of a
coherent approach to the question of when more restrictive
alternatives should in fact carry doctrinal weight.
That sets the stage for the analytical part of the inquiry. Part III
begins by disaggregating and describing two different mechanisms by
which a more restrictive alternative can highlight constitutional
defects in a less restrictive law.12 First, the more restrictive alternative
might help to highlight equality-related defects in the law under
review. Where a law employs a form of discriminatory treatment that
the doctrine disfavors, a court has reason to invalidate the law if it can
determine that the discriminatory treatment is not necessary to the
achievement of the government’s ends, and a more restrictive
alternative can often help to demonstrate that this is the case. The
hypothetical “no political rallies” law, for instance, draws a contentbased distinction between political and non-political rallies. But there
exist several more restrictive alternatives to that law that could just as
effectively further the relevant government interests (i.e., peace and
tranquility for city residents) without discriminating between rallies
on the basis of their subject matter (e.g., “no rallies, period”; “no
gathering on the streets”). And because the First Amendment
disfavors content discrimination as such, a court might well conclude
that the city went about pursuing its interests in a manner that is
unnecessarily discriminatory and therefore constitutionally
impermissible. More restrictive alternatives, in other words, can often
function as nondiscriminatory alternatives, undercutting the
government’s claim that a particular regulatory interest requires it to
discriminate in a constitutionally problematic fashion.

12. Other commentators have alluded to this basic distinction, especially as it arises in
the free-speech context. See, e.g., Volokh, Freedom of Speech, supra note 2, at 2423
(noting, in the free speech context, that a law’s underinclusiveness may demonstrate “that
the interest isn’t very important, or that the government’s real interest wasn’t the stated
one but was rather just a desire to favor one form of speech over another, or to suppress
offensive or otherwise disfavored speech,” and that underinclusiveness may also
demonstrate that “the presence of content discrimination beyond that justified by the
compelling interest”); see also City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 51–52 (1994) (quoting
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785 (1978)) (noting that
underinclusiveness might reveal the existence of an impermissible “attempt to give one
side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people,” or
instead might “diminish the credibility of the government’s rationale for restricting speech
in the first place”); ARTHUR D. HELLMAN, WILLIAM D. ARAIZA & THOMAS E. BAKER,
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION & FREEDOM OF RELIGION 407–08
(2nd ed. 2011) (describing the two different accounts of underinclusiveness offered by the
Court in City of Ladue).
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But more restrictive alternatives do not operate solely in
connection with an established legal presumption against
discriminatory treatment: claimants might also invoke a more
restrictive means to support a sincerity-based attack on a
constitutionally suspect law. More specifically, where a challenged
law furthers a claimed government interest with only some
effectiveness, and where a more restrictive law would serve that
government interest with greater effectiveness, the government’s
failure to regulate more restrictively may support an inference that
the regulatory object of a law is something other than the interest that
the government has identified. Our hypothetical “no political rallies”
law might suffer from this constitutional defect as well. If it turned out
that sports-related rallies caused more chaos and disruption within
the city than did political rallies, the city’s failure to include sportsrelated rallies within the scope of its anti-rallying ordinance would
complicate its efforts to justify the law as a peace- and tranquilitypromoting measure. That the city has chosen to regulate less
restrictively might indicate that it is actually seeking to suppress
undesirable political speech, pursuing an aim that the First
Amendment flatly condemns. The more restrictive alternative thus
helps to reveal that the government has done less than what a true
commitment to a legitimate interest would require, and that
revelation, in turn, provides a ground for supposing that some other,
illegitimate interest actually underlies the less restrictive law under
review.
The equality- and sincerity-based rationales for more restrictive
means analysis thus help to answer the question of why courts should
sometimes treat a law’s relative lenience as a constitutional liability.
But with that question answered, a second analytical challenge arises:
if more restrictive alternatives should sometimes carry force, then we
must next explain why they sometimes should not. At first glance, the
underlying logic of both the equality- and sincerity-related arguments
might seem to enjoy a nearly limitless range of successful application,
pushing toward the bizarre conclusion that the only constitutionally
acceptable regime is one in which no one is ever allowed to do
anything anywhere. Common sense and everyday practice indicate
that this is clearly not the case, but some additional analytical work is
needed to explain why that is so. Thus, the remainder of the Article,
set forth in Parts IV and V, attempts to identify, taxonomize, and
evaluate the various types of arguments that government actors might
offer in response to the claim that they have regulated with
insufficient restrictiveness. These Parts thus lay out the sorts of
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considerations that function to cabin the scope of the equality- and
sincerity-based arguments, and they also highlight the various ways in
which government actors might appeal to these considerations in
rebutting a claim of insufficient restrictiveness.
The first set of considerations, canvassed in Part IV, concerns
issues of regulatory viability. Both the equality- and sincerity-based
applications of more restrictive means analysis require some
investigation of the extent to which a more restrictive alternative
would serve the government interests invoked on behalf of a
challenged law. That investigation, in turn, creates an opening for the
government to argue that the posited alternative is not in fact an
adequate regulatory substitute. The government might pursue this
claim in four different ways, arguing that a more restrictive
alternative would (1) yield little in the way of additional regulatory
benefits, (2) prove too costly to administer, (3) actively undermine
the regulatory interests that a challenged law directly pursues, and/or
(4) undermine other government interests associated with the lenient
aspects of the status quo regime. Some of these claims are more
persuasive than others, and their persuasiveness will often depend on
whether the claimant is advancing an equality- or sincerity-based
attack. But by separating out these claims and evaluating each on its
own terms, we can help to lay the groundwork for a more coherent
and principled judicial assessment of the comparative regulatory
merits of more restrictive alternatives and their less restrictive
counterparts.
A second set of considerations, canvassed in Part V, centers on
the issue of constitutional viability. Simply put, the government might
sometimes defend its failure to adopt a more restrictive alternative by
contending that the alternative itself would create constitutional
problems. Perhaps, for instance, an expanded prohibition on all
rallying would itself violate the First Amendment, in which case the
government could point to the likely unconstitutionality of the more
restrictive alternative as helping to justify its enactment of a less
restrictive law. This sort of “constitutional viability” defense gives rise
to a question that is both theoretically interesting and practically
important: to what extent must a posited more restrictive alternative
itself avoid constitutional difficulties in order to carry doctrinal
weight? That question may seem easy to answer. Obviously, one
might say, a more restrictive means must itself qualify as
unambiguously valid in order to support a constitutional attack on a
less restrictive law. But in fact, the answer is not as straightforward as
it may appear. The general, if somewhat counterintuitive, conclusion
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is that, while an unconstitutional more restrictive alternative can
never support an equality-based attack on a less restrictive law, it can
sometimes support a sincerity-based attack on the same.
Before we proceed further, two methodological clarifications are
in order. First, as this Introduction reveals, the ensuing analysis treats
more restrictive means analysis as a trans-substantive problem of
constitutional law, according only limited significance to the
traditional boundaries that divide up constitutional doctrine. Some
limits, however, necessarily constrain the Article’s scope. Most
importantly, the Article considers only those areas of doctrine that
require a judicial assessment of the fit between a challenged law and
the government interests it is said to serve; where no such
“means/ends” assessment is required, more restrictive alternatives
will prove irrelevant to the cases being decided. What is more, the
Article focuses primarily on doctrines that call for heightened
means/ends scrutiny of constitutionally suspect laws, taking it largely
for granted that the presence or absence of more restrictive
alternatives will not often influence the court’s application of rational
basis review.13 Put another way, the domain of the Article includes all
areas of doctrine where courts (a) must assess the means by which a
challenged law furthers a stated government interest, and (b) must do
so according to a level of scrutiny that is at least somewhat more
exacting than standard-form rational basis analysis.14
Second, with respect to the evaluative and prescriptive
components of the inquiry, the Article attempts to steer a middle
course between the twin extremes of rigid doctrinal fidelity and
freewheeling doctrinal reform. This analysis does not go so far as to
take all features of the doctrine as established and unchangeable (in
which case evaluation and prescription would be impossible), but it
also does not treat every feature of the doctrine as flexible and up for
grabs (in which case evaluation and prescription would be of little

13. This point finds support in the Court’s oft-quoted suggestion that—as far as
rational basis analysis is concerned—the government is free to confront a regulatory
problem “one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems
most acute to the legislative mind.” Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489
(1955). So long as that proposition remains true, claimants will have difficulty convincing
courts that a law that confronts one “phase” of a problem but not another should be
invalidated in light of more restrictive alternatives that would confront more phases of the
problem at the same time.
14. I do discuss a few cases that, while purporting to apply standard rational basis
review, in fact depart substantially from its traditionally deferential mood. See, e.g., infra
Section II.C (discussing the Court’s implementation of “rational basis with bite” review in
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985)).
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practical use). Here, in particular, the study focuses on the particular
phenomenon of more restrictive means analysis, while leaving largely
unquestioned the broader constitutional frameworks within which
that analysis operates. Thus, for instance, the Article does not
consider whether means/ends analysis should itself play a significant
role in guiding the application of many different constitutional
guarantees, whether different types of governmental regulation
should trigger meaningfully different levels of means/ends scrutiny
(e.g., strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, rational basis), whether
facially discriminatory laws should face tougher constitutionally
scrutiny than do facially neutral laws with discriminatory effects, and
so forth. In taking these propositions as a given, I do not mean to
suggest that they are immune from criticism. Rather, my concern in
this Article is the narrower question of what those propositions imply
when it comes to asking whether the government has regulated with
insufficient restrictiveness. To be sure, these insights may yield some
troubling or untoward results, which may require a rethinking of the
overall wisdom of more restrictive means analysis and the premises
that give it force. But before that rethinking occurs, we need first to
understand where the analysis comes from and how it relates to
broader features of the doctrine writ large. That is what this Article
attempts to do.
I. DEFINING “MORE RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVES”
A. Restrictiveness Defined
Under what circumstances does one law qualify as “more
restrictive” than another?15 For purposes of this Article, the following
definition will apply:

15. I am aware of only a few instances in which the Court or one of its members has
used the phrase “more restrictive” in the manner I describe. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 404 n.5 (1992) (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (attributing to
the majority opinion the conclusion that a more restrictive alternative could adequately
serve the compelling need identified by St. Paul lawmakers); Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 649 (1985) (“We are not persuaded that identifying
deceptive or manipulative uses of visual media in advertising is so intrinsically
burdensome that the State is entitled to forgo that task in favor of the more convenient
but far more restrictive alternative of a blanket ban on the use of illustrations.”); Clements
v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 989 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“A provision directed only
at Texas officeholders, that gave those officeholders a choice between resigning and
serving out their current terms would serve all of the asserted state interests; yet Texas has
inexplicably chosen this far more restrictive alternative.”); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,
475 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“Under the Court’s approach today, the State
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+

Law A is “more restrictive” than Law A when it is true that
+
either: (a) at least one individual party regulated by Law A is
subject to a regulatory burden that is more severe than what that
party experienced under Law A, and no regulated party is subject
to a regulatory burden that is less severe than what that party
experienced under Law A, or (b) at least one individual party
+
regulated by Law A receives a regulatory benefit that is less
generous than what that party experienced under Law A, and no
regulated party receives a regulatory benefit that is more
generous than what that party experienced under Law A.
More generally, if government actors modify a law so as to
improve its treatment of nonregulated parties and to worsen its
treatment of at least one regulated party, then the modified law
qualifies as a more restrictive alternative to the unmodified law.16
A few features of this definition warrant emphasis. First and
foremost, the definition proceeds in relative terms, meaning that a
given law’s status as a more restrictive alternative exists in relation to
an established legal baseline. A law might qualify as a more restrictive
alternative in comparison to one law but not in comparison to
another—its status as such depends on the particular legal reference
point against which it is being evaluated. The definition, in other
words, does not attempt to posit some threshold level of
restrictiveness that differentiates restrictive and nonrestrictive laws.
Rather, it attempts only to furnish some means of determining
whether one law counts as more or less restrictive in relation to
another.
Second, in gauging relative levels of restrictiveness, the definition
focuses on formal legal treatment of regulated parties. This condition
thus deliberately omits the experiences of nonregulated parties, who
sometimes may find themselves significantly less restricted on account
of a formally more restrictive means.17 Consider, for instance,
would fare better by adopting more restrictive means, a judicial incentive I had thought
this Court would hesitate to afford.”).
16. In this sense, a more restrictive alternative might be characterized as “Pareto
inferior” to its less restrictive counterpart—at least where the relevant Pareto principle is
“strong” rather than “weak” and the only costs and benefits being considered are the costs
and benefits formally allocated by the law. See generally MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELLBEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 53 (2012)
(distinguishing between the “strong” Pareto principle, which deems x as superior to y if no
one is worse off under x and at least some are better off under y, and the “weak” Pareto
principle, which deems x as superior to y if everyone is better off under x and no one is
worse off under x).
17. I should further emphasize that in distinguishing between regulated and
nonregulated parties I do not mean to suggest as a normative matter that the interests of
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legislative action that expands the reach of an antipollution statute.
Under the definition adopted here, the expanded antipollution statute
would qualify as more restrictive than the previous antipollution
statute if it improved the lot of zero would-be polluters and worsened
the lot of at least some would-be polluters. And that would remain so
even if the law produced a significantly less restrictive environment
for everyone else via improvements to public health and outdoor
enjoyment. All laws produce winners and losers, and some increases
in formal restrictiveness will nonetheless generate welfare- and
liberty-promoting results for regulatory beneficiaries. But the
definition offered here does not attempt to account for all of these
consequences. Rather, it assumes the perspective of each party
regulated by a law and asks, from that perspective, whether the law’s
formal treatment of the individual has become more burdensome (or
less beneficial) than had previously been the case.
Third, and relatedly, the definition ignores the system-wide
effects of the two laws subject to comparison.18 Restrictiveness is
gauged from an atomized and individualistic perspective, with the
benefits and burdens imposed on one party viewed in isolation from
the benefits and burdens imposed on other parties. Suppose, for
instance, that Law A taxes in-state citizens at five percent and out-of+
state citizens at ten percent, and suppose further that Law A taxes
both in-state and out-of-state citizens at ten percent.19 Out-of-state
+
citizens may plausibly claim that they fare better under Law A than
under Law A, for the simple reason that Law A, while leaving their
tax rates unchanged, at least “eliminates the unfairness of being
treated differently.”20 Valid as that consideration may be, however, it
has no bearing on the relative restrictiveness of Law A, because
“restrictiveness,” as we have defined it, excludes cross-party
comparisons in regulatory treatment. In other words, for the limited
+
purpose of asking whether Law A counts as more or less restrictive
than Law A, we should ignore any positive effects that arise on
the former should in fact be greater cause for concern than the interests of the latter. Cf.
Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III,
91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 186–88 (1992) (suggesting that the distinction between “regulated
objects” and “regulatory beneficiaries” “load[s] the dice” by falsely presupposing a
natural, baseline state of affairs in which the endowments and entitlements of “regulated
objects” exist entirely independent of the common law regime).
18. See Adrian Vermeule, Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 6 (2009).
19. See Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1823 (2015) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (providing an analogous illustration where “leveling up” or “leveling down”
alleviates a discriminatory tax).
20. Id.
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account of any one party’s awareness of how the law treats similarly
situated parties. This is not to say that such effects are unimportant.
To the contrary, these effects go a long way towards explaining why
more restrictive alternatives sometimes prove constitutionally
preferable to their less restrictive counterparts. But for purposes of
analytical clarity, “cross-party dynamics” of this sort are best left out
of the threshold determination of whether one law qualifies as “more
restrictive” than another.
None of these three conditions is intended to signal any
normative or constitutional assumptions about the desirability of
increasing (or decreasing) a law’s restrictiveness. The conditions
instead reflect a set of definitional choices, intended to establish a
useful analytical framework for understanding a set of complex
problems that courts routinely confront. I emphasize that I am
claiming no essential truths here; to the extent that one would prefer
to understand restrictiveness differently, alternative conceptual
frameworks could certainly be developed. The important point is
simply that the concept of a “more restrictive alternative” by no
means equates with the concept of a “less constitutional alternative”
(nor does it equate to the concept of a “less desirable alternative”).
When and how those concepts should equate is an interesting
question that will be taken up in due course.21 For the time being,
+
however, it suffices to say that by identifying Law A as more
restrictive than Law A, one need not embrace any evaluative
conclusions about how those two laws should be dealt with by the
courts.
B. Related Concepts
1. Nondiscriminatory Alternatives
A “nondiscriminatory alternative,” as its name suggests, pursues
an identified government interest in a manner that avoids a
constitutionally suspect form of discriminatory treatment.22 This
concept arises with frequency in U.S. constitutional law.23 In the equal
protection context, for instance, courts sometimes ask whether there
exists a “race-neutral” means of achieving the government interests

21. See infra Part V.
22. See Fee, supra note 8, at 109.
23. See id. at 109–13 (noting the emergence of “antidiscrimination rules” within
several different areas of constitutional law).
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underlying a non-race-neutral law,24 or whether there exists a
“gender-neutral” alternative to a “gender-based” law.25 In the free
speech context, courts often inquire into whether there exists a
“content-neutral” means of achieving the government interests
underlying a “content-based law.”26 And in the dormant Commerce
Clause context, courts sometimes ask whether there exists a
nondiscriminatory means of achieving the government’s interests
underlying a law that facially discriminates against interstate
commerce.27 A “nondiscriminatory alternative,” in short, is any
proposed alternative to a challenged law that steers clear of the
constitutionally problematic form of discriminatory treatment that the
challenged law employs.
How do nondiscriminatory alternatives relate to more restrictive
alternatives? In many cases, a more restrictive alternative will turn
out also to be a nondiscriminatory alternative, and vice versa.28 But
the categories are not in fact co-extensive. Nondiscriminatory
alternatives can just as easily qualify as less restrictive (compare, for
instance, a hypothetical twenty percent/ten percent tax to an acrossthe-board tax at ten percent), or as neither more nor less restrictive in
an absolute sense (compare, again, the twenty percent/ten percent tax
to an across-the-board tax at fifteen percent). This is another way of
saying that governments can alleviate inequalities in different ways.
They can “level down” a law’s treatment of previously advantaged
parties to match its treatment of previously disadvantaged parties;
they can “level up” a law’s treatment of previously disadvantaged
parties to match its treatment of previously advantaged parties; or
they can “level to the middle,” by partially ameliorating a law’s
treatment of the previously disadvantaged parties and partially

24. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003) (“Narrow tailoring . . .
require[s] serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives . . . .”).
25. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (“Where, as here, the State’s . . .
purposes are as well served by a gender-neutral classification as one that gender classifies
and therefore carries with it the baggage of sexual stereotypes, the State cannot be
permitted to classify on the basis of sex.”).
26. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992) (noting that
“existence of adequate content-neutral alternatives thus ‘undercut[s] significantly’ any
defense of . . . a [content-based] statute”) (citing Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988)).
27. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (noting that “facial
discrimination invokes the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose and
of the absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives”).
28. Compare, for instance, a rule that taxes A at twenty percent and B at ten percent
with an alternative rule that taxes both A and B at twenty percent; the latter qualifies as
both nondiscriminatory as between A and B and more restrictive than the original rule.
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worsening its treatment of previously advantaged parties.29 All three
modifications are capable of producing nondiscriminatory
alternatives, but only one of them is capable of producing a more
restrictive alternative as well.
Thus, not all nondiscriminatory alternatives qualify as more
restrictive alternatives. Nor, for that matter, do all more restrictive
alternatives qualify as nondiscriminatory alternatives. For example,
rather than tax A at ten percent and B at twenty percent, a
government might instead tax A at ten percent and B at thirty
percent. In no sense does the modified law alleviate discriminatory
treatment of A and B (if anything, it exacerbates it), but the new law
would still qualify as more restrictive than the law that it replaced.
Further, some more restrictive alternatives might exist in relation to
laws that are not even discriminatory in the first place. A law that
prohibits everyone from purchasing guns, for instance, might not give
rise to a discrimination-based constitutional claim. But we can still
imagine alternatives to such a law that would qualify as
unambiguously more restrictive than the status quo regime.30 The
category of more restrictive alternatives, in short, is neither
coextensive with, nor subsumed by, the category of nondiscriminatory
alternatives. A law can be more restrictive without being
nondiscriminatory, just as it can be nondiscriminatory without being
more restrictive.
2. Underinclusiveness
More restrictive means analysis also relates closely to the
concept of “underinclusiveness.” Generally speaking, courts and
commentators use the term “underinclusive” to describe a law that
applies less broadly than they would either expect or prefer to be the
case.31 Not surprisingly, more restrictive means analysis will often
29. See Brake, supra note 4, at 515 (questioning the “presumptive permissibility of
leveling down” as a means of remediating violations of equality-based norms).
30. Consider, for example, a law that prevents everyone from purchasing guns and
knives.
31. Tussman and tenBroek, for instance, define “underinclusiveness” by reference to
the relationship between the “Trait” (“T”) underlying a legal classification and the
“Mischief” (“M”) that the law attempts to mitigate. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note
11, at 347. As they explain, an underinclusive statute is one for which “[a]ll T’s are M’s but
some M’s are not T’s”—or, less abstractly, for which “[a]ll who are included in the class
[defined by the Trait] are tainted with the mischief, but there are others also tainted whom
the classification does not include.” Id. at 347–48. The term can also mean other things in
other contexts. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of First Amendment Neutrality:
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Rust v. Sullivan, and the Problem of Content-Based Underinclusion,
1992 SUP. CT. REV. 29, 38 (1992) (suggesting that “content-based underinclusion” inheres

96 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2017)

18

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

implicate this general idea. Suppose, for instance, that a state
attempts to reduce the incidence of drunk driving by restricting
alcohol purchases by males under the age of twenty-one and by
females under the age of eighteen.32 Suppose further that the state
could more effectively achieve this interest by extending the ban to
include females between the age of eighteen and twenty, thus
expanding the pool of individuals subject to the restriction. Under
these circumstances, the more restrictive alternative of a stricter,
gender-neutral prohibition on purchasing alcohol would help to
demonstrate the underinclusiveness of the less restrictive law under
review. In other words, the law’s underinclusiveness is a condition
made manifest by the availability of a more restrictive alternative.
The gender-based alcohol-purchasing requirement is underinclusive
by virtue of the fact that a more restrictive (and gender-neutral)
prohibition would achieve the state’s interests more effectively than
the less restrictive (and gender-based) prohibition being challenged.
Here too, however, the two concepts do not perfectly equate. For
one thing, not every more restrictive alternative will suffice to
demonstrate the underinclusive nature of a less restrictive law. It is
always possible to imagine more restrictive alternatives to a
constitutionally suspect law, but as Part III of this Article will show,
not all such alternatives will achieve the relevant government
interests as effectively as the “less restrictive” law under review. If,
for instance, a forty percent tax on everyone serves the government’s
regulatory interests just as well as a fifty percent tax on everyone,
then the fifty percent tax—while certainly more restrictive than the
twenty percent tax—does not showcase any real underinclusiveness
problems in the law being reviewed.
In addition, as it is conventionally used, the term underinclusive
will sometimes end up pointing to the existence of an alternative that
is less restrictive rather than more. Suppose, for instance, that a public
scholarship program categorically withholds benefits from 1,000
individuals whose inclusion would help to further the purposes of the
program itself. Intuitively, the program appears to be underinclusive:
the scope of its coverage is narrower than what its underlying
interests would appear to demand.33 That conclusion, however, would
in “government action [that] is, in the ordinary sense, narrower than the action stipulated
to be constitutional”).
32. See, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 190 (1976) (providing a factually analogous
illustration).
33. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 637 (1974) (holding that a provision
of the Social Security Act designed to support the dependents of a disabled individual was
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stem from the availability of an alternative program that treats none
of the existing scholarship recipients any worse and at least some
existing non-recipients much better—i.e., a less restrictive alternative,
as the term is defined here.34 In this example, at least, the alignments
have
switched:
more
restrictive
alternatives
accompany
overinclusiveness problems and less restrictive alternatives
accompany underinclusiveness problems. Generalizing further, we
might say that the connection between underinclusiveness and
insufficient restrictiveness exists only in circumstances where
expanding a law’s coverage results in a worsening of its overall
treatment of regulated parties; the connection does not exist when an
expansion of coverage redounds to the benefit of newly covered
parties.
In sum, a more restrictive alternative is a law that—compared to
some pre-existing baseline—increases regulatory burdens (or reduces
regulatory benefits) on some regulated parties, without also reducing
regulatory burdens (or increasing regulatory benefits) on other
regulated parties. A more restrictive alternative will sometimes but
not always qualify as a nondiscriminatory alternative, just as a
nondiscriminatory alternative will sometimes, but not always, qualify
as a more restrictive alternative. Similarly, a more restrictive
alternative will sometimes, but not always, highlight the existence of
underinclusiveness problems, just as underinclusiveness problems will
sometimes, but not always, imply the existence of a more restrictive
alternative.
II. MORE RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVES IN U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
How have courts utilized more restrictive means analysis in
constitutional cases? The answer to this question is not simple. As this
Part demonstrates, courts have employed a variety of different
“‘underinclusive’ in that it conclusively excludes some illegitimate [children] . . . who are,
in fact, dependent upon their disabled parent”); Henderson v. Stalder, 287 F.3d 374, 390
(5th Cir. 2002) (“A person or group excluded from benefits conveyed via an underinclusive
statute has standing to challenge the statute on constitutional grounds.”) (emphasis
added); Wauchope v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 985 F.2d 1407, 1418 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that
courts may sometimes “redress[] constitutionally underinclusive statutes by extending their
benefits to a disfavored class” (emphasis added)).
34. By the same token, if the existing program extended benefits to more individuals
than its regulatory interests demanded, we would characterize the program as
“overinclusive”: the scope of its coverage is broader than what its underlying interests
would appear to demand. But that conclusion would imply the availability of an
alternative program that treats at least some of its existing recipients worse and none of its
existing non-recipients any better—i.e., a more restrictive alternative.
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approaches to the problem, with no obvious pattern emerging from
the cases as a whole. In some cases, courts willingly accept the
presence of a more restrictive alternative as a reason to invalidate a
challenged law. In other cases, courts expressly reject—on a number
of different grounds—the claim that a law should fail because a more
restrictive alternative would achieve its underlying interests. And in
other cases, still, courts avoid the issue altogether. All three
approaches are on display in different areas of constitutional doctrine,
as the ensuing discussion reveals.
What follows is by no means an exhaustive survey of cases in
which courts have confronted (or not confronted) arguments about
more restrictive alternatives. Rather, this Part focuses on six areas of
law in which the issue has arisen: free speech doctrine, free exercise
doctrine, equal protection doctrine, substantive due process doctrine,
dormant commerce doctrine, and case law involving the newlyrevitalized “equal sovereignty” principle. But these are not the only
areas of law in which more restrictive means analysis either does or
might come into play.35 Nor, for that matter, is my discussion of any
given area intended to be comprehensive within its own sphere. The
goal here, in other words, is not to offer a complete catalogue of cases
(or even clauses) that touch on the subject of this Article. It is, rather,
simply to showcase the variety of approaches that the Court has taken
to more restrictive means analysis, and to suggest that the Court lacks
a systematic framework for working through the problems to which
the analysis gives rise.
A. Free Speech
At least as far back as Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,36
the Supreme Court has drawn a critical doctrinal distinction between
laws that regulate speech on the basis of its content and laws that
regulate speech on the basis of some other “content-neutral”
characteristic.37 This distinction—which underlies the so-called
“content discrimination” principle—finds expression in the
35. Consider, for example, questions concerning the scope of Congress’s power to
enforce the Reconstruction Amendments, which, as the Court has held, encompasses only
“remedial measures” that are “congrue[nt] and proportional[]” in relation to the “injury to
be prevented.” City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508, 530 (1997). As Evan Caminker
has suggested, that test may incorporate its own sort of “means-ends” analysis, which in
turn could provide a basis for invalidating a remedial statute on “underinclusiveness”
grounds. See Evan H. Caminker, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5
Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1153–54 (2001).
36. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
37. Id. at 95.
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differential levels of means/ends scrutiny accorded to content-based
and content-neutral laws.38 And the content-discrimination principle
in turn has generated several cases in which the Court has faulted the
government for its failure to regulate more restrictively.39
Consider R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.40 The city of St. Paul had
criminalized certain forms of expression that “arouse[d] anger, alarm
or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender.”41 The Minnesota Supreme Court had interpreted the law as
a ban on “fighting words,” a historically recognized category of
unprotected speech.42 The majority in R.A.V. did not question that
conclusion, but it nevertheless proceeded to invalidate the law on
First Amendment grounds.43 The problem, in short, was one of
insufficient breadth: St. Paul had chosen to target some “fighting
words” but not others, and it had distinguished between prohibited
and non-prohibited fighting words on the basis of their content.44
This, the Court held, St. Paul could not do.45 If St. Paul wished to
pursue its government interest in “ensur[ing] the basic human rights
of members of groups that have historically been subjected to
discrimination,” it needed to enact a law relating to fighting words
that was “not limited to the favored topics.”46 Or, as Justice White put
the point in a separate opinion, the majority in R.A.V. had invalidated
the St. Paul ordinance on account of its determination that a “more
restrictive alternative could adequately serve the compelling need
identified by St. Paul lawmakers.”47
Other free speech cases reveal a similar reliance on more
restrictive means analysis. Recently, for instance, the Court struck
down a content-discriminatory prohibition on the display of road
38. See, e.g., Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231,
235–36 (2012); Barry P. McDonald, Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach
to Protecting the Freedom of Expression, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1348–49 (2006);
Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV.
113, 114 (1981); Stone, supra note 7 at 205.
39. For an analysis of earlier cases, see Lee, supra note 11, at 637, 637 n.3.
40. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
41. Id. at 380.
42. Id. at 381.
43. Id. at 382.
44. Id. at 391.
45. Id. The latter part of this conclusion was controversial, given that the ordinance
drew its content-based distinction within a category of so-called “unprotected speech.” See
id. at 401 (White, J., concurring). Nevertheless, as the R.A.V. majority made clear,
content-discriminatory laws remained constitutionally suspect even when applied to
subsets of unprotected speech. Id. at 387 (majority opinion).
46. Id. at 395–96.
47. Id. at 404 n.5 (White, J., concurring).
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signs, focusing its attention on the “hopelessly underinclusive” nature
of the law’s coverage.48 The government had claimed, for instance, an
interest in preserving aesthetics, but, as the majority opinion
skeptically noted, it had simultaneously “allow[ed] [the] unlimited
proliferation of larger ideological signs while strictly limiting the
number, size, and duration of smaller directional ones.”49 Similarly,
the government had claimed an interest in promoting traffic safety.
But it had failed to offer any “reason to believe that directional signs
pose a greater threat to safety than do ideological or political signs.”50
The government, to be sure, had identified plausible justifications for
its limitations on the placement of road signs, but it had failed to limit
such signage in a sufficiently restrictive way.51 In that way, then, the
more restrictive alternative of a stricter anti-sign ordinance
contributed to the constitutional invalidity of the law under review.52
The availability of a more restrictive means, however, has not
always spelled the doom of a speech-infringing law. In Burson v.
Freeman,53 the Court considered a content-based prohibition on
political campaigning at polling places, said to be necessary in light of
the state’s interests in preventing voter intimidation and election
fraud.54 A plurality of Justices held that the law withstood strict
scrutiny, even while appearing to acknowledge that the state could
have just as easily achieved its interests by extending the ban to

48. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2232.
51. Id.
52. R.A.V. and Gilbert by no means exhaust the universe of free-speech cases in which
the Court has approvingly cited to a more restrictive alternative as grounds for
invalidating a less restrictive law. In Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980), for instance, the
Court struck down an Illinois anti-picketing ordinance that exempted certain forms of
picketing related to a labor dispute. Id. at 457. Illinois defended the law by referencing a
government interest in promoting residential privacy. Id. at 462. But this argument failed,
the Court held, in light of the statute’s failure to restrict labor-related picketing, which was
“equally likely to intrude on the tranquility of the home.” Id.; see also Police Dep’t of
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 100 (1972) (“If peaceful labor picketing is permitted, there
is no justification for prohibiting all nonlabor picketing, both peaceful and nonpeaceful.
‘Peaceful’ nonlabor picketing, however the term ‘peaceful’ is defined, is obviously no more
disruptive than ‘peaceful’ labor picketing. But Chicago’s ordinance permits the latter and
prohibits the former.”). Dissenting from the Court’s holding, then-Justice Rehnquist was
quick to notice (and criticize) the Court’s reliance on a “more restrictive means.” Carey,
447 U.S. at 475 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). As he put it, the Court’s approach led to the
strange and counterintuitive result that “the State would fare better by adopting more
restrictive means, a judicial incentive I had thought this Court would hesitate to afford.”
Id. For additional examples of such cases, see generally Lee, supra note 11.
53. 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
54. Id. at 198–99.
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encompass both political and nonpolitical solicitation at polling
places.55 According to the plurality, however, the law’s “failure to
regulate all speech” did not “render[] [it] fatally underinclusive,”
given the absence of “evidence that political candidates have used
other forms of solicitation or exit polling to commit [] electoral
abuses.”56 Thus, the state’s failure to enact a more restrictive
alternative was excused on the ground that “[t]he First Amendment
does not require States to regulate for problems that do not exist.”57
Similarly, in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar,58 the Court again cast
aside a proposed more restrictive alternative when it upheld a Florida
prohibition on political fundraising by judicial candidates.59 The state
defended the law as necessary to preserve both the actuality and
appearance of “judicial integrity” within the court system,60 and the
challenger responded by claiming, inter alia, that the law failed to
pursue these interests in a sufficiently restrictive fashion.61
Specifically, the challenger argued, the law lacked narrow tailoring on
account of its failure to reach additional forms of integrity-impairing
behavior: among other things, for instance, Florida did not prohibit
third-party communications made on behalf of judicial candidates,
even though those communications “arguably reduce[d] public
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary just as much as a judge’s
personal solicitation.”62 But the Court waved the argument away.
Reasoning that “[i]t is always somewhat counterintuitive to argue that
a law violates the First Amendment by abridging too little speech,”
the Court went on to conclude that the law raised “no fatal
underinclusivity concerns.”63 This was so, the Court explained,
because “personal solicitation by judicial candidates implicates a
different problem than solicitation by campaign committees,” and “a
State may conclude that they present markedly different appearances
to the public.”64 And, quoting Burson, the Court reiterated that “[t]he

55. Id. at 207.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
59. Id. at 1673.
60. Id. at 1666.
61. Id. at 1668.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1669; see also Calvert, supra note 11, at 561 (noting that the “key” to the
Court’s “logic” in Williams-Yulee was “the alleged noncomparability between the
regulated and unregulated varieties of speech”).
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First Amendment does not require States to regulate for problems
that do not exist.”65
Other free speech cases have left the problem of more restrictive
alternatives largely unexplored. Consider, for instance, Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project,66 in which the Court upheld against First
Amendment attack a federal statute making it a crime to “knowingly
provid[e] material support or resources to a foreign terrorist
organization.”67 This statute, the Court held, was content-based in
that its coverage both (a) encompassed verbal communications with
terrorist groups, and (b) depended on what those communications
expressed.68 Even so, the statute withstood heightened scrutiny,69 with
the Court concluding that the burdens imposed on materially
supportive speech were sufficiently well tailored to a compelling
governmental interest in “combating terrorism,” and that there
existed no less restrictive means of achieving those interests in a
comparably effective way.70 Left unanalyzed, however, was the
question whether Congress might have pursued this interest by simply
prohibiting all communications directed at foreign terrorist
organizations, regardless of their content. Such a more restrictive
means would have mitigated (if not eliminated) the contentdiscriminatory features of the statute, without in any obvious manner
frustrating the government’s pursuit of the “terrorism prevention”
interest that was said to necessitate the content-based ban. Even on
65. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1670 (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 207
(1992)); see also McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2532 (2014) (rejecting the claim
that Massachusetts should have dealt with the problem of protests at abortion clinics via
the more restrictive alternative of a “buffer zone” requirement that covered “‘every
building in the State that hosts any activity that might occasion protest or comment,’ not
just abortion clinics” (citing Brief for Petitioner at 24, McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct.
2518 (2014) (No. 12-1168), 2013 WL 4829340, at *24)).
66. 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
67. Id. at 8 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006)).
68. Id. at 27. The statute would apply, for instance, if a speaker provided instruction
regarding a “specific skill” or communicated “specialized knowledge,” but it would not
apply if the speaker imparted “only general or unspecialized knowledge.” Id.
69. Id. at 28. As Professor Volokh has noted, it is not altogether clear whether the
Court in Humanitarian Law Project understood itself to be applying “strict scrutiny” or a
somewhat more lenient standard. Eugene Volokh, Speech That Aids Foreign Terrorist
Organizations, and Strict Scrutiny, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 21, 2010),
http://volokh.com/2010/06/21/speech-that-aids-foreign-terrorist-organizations-and-strictscrutiny [https://perma.cc/9GNA-XL9M].
70. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 28–32. Specifically, the Court rejected the
claim that Congress might have prohibited only those forms of material support that aided
the “peaceable, lawful conduct” of foreign terrorist groups. Id. at 32; see also id. at 46
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority that the statute reflected the “least
restrictive means” of achieving the government’s terrorism-prevention interests).
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the premises accepted by the majority in Humanitarian Law Project,
there seemed to exist a potentially relevant more restrictive (and
content-neutral) means of serving the government’s interest.
Nevertheless, in an arguable departure from the approach taken in
R.A.V., Reed, and Burson, the Court in Humanitarian Law Project
did not consider the doctrinal implications of that fact, let alone
acknowledge its existence.
B. Free Exercise
In Employment Division v. Smith,71 the Court significantly
narrowed the reach of the Free Exercise Clause, holding that the First
Amendment permitted the government to “impose an ‘incidental
effect’” on religious practices through the enactment and
enforcement of “neutral law[s] of general applicability.”72 Smith thus
transitioned the law out of an old regime in which the Court closely
reviewed all laws that burdened religious practices and into a new
regime in which the Court closely reviewed only those laws that
targeted religion.73 The practical implications of the decision were
clear: governments could insulate religion-burdening laws against free
exercise attack by broadening rather than narrowing their
applicability. That, in turn, created opportunities for the Court to
invoke the availability of a more restrictive alternative as a ground for
invalidating a religion-targeting law.
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah74
illustrates the point. Adherents to the Santeria faith challenged a set
of rules regarding the ritualized killing of animals, claiming
discrimination on the basis of their religious beliefs.75 The Supreme
Court agreed with the challengers, concluding that the animal
sacrifice laws were not in fact neutral or generally applicable with
respect to religion. Why? Largely due to the availability of more
restrictive alternatives that could have just as easily served the
interests associated with the less restrictive enactments. Specifically,
the City had argued that its ordinance helped to “protect[] the public
71. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
72. Id. at 879, 882 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)).
73. Id. at 882. The Court in Smith did recognize certain exceptions to this rule, noting,
for instance, that heightened scrutiny might remain when a generally applicable law
simultaneously implicated the free-exercise right and some other right, id. at 881–82
(citing, inter alia, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)), or when a generally applicable
law “lent itself to individualized governmental assessment” of particular forms of conduct,
id. at 883–84 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
74. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
75. Id. at 528.
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health” and “prevent[] cruelty to animals.”76 Both interests, however,
could have been furthered by laws that applied to a wider range of
nonreligious practices. As to the “animal cruelty” interest, the City’s
argument failed because its law did not forbid (and indeed sometimes
explicitly authorized) several nonreligious animal-killing practices—
practices such as “fishing,” “euthanasia of stray, neglected,
abandoned, or unwanted animals,” “the infliction of pain or suffering
in the interest of medical science,” and the “hunt[ing] [of] wild
hogs.”77
Likewise, as to the “public health” interest, the City had again
pursued the goal too narrowly, failing to regulate, say, “hunters[]
bringing their kill to their houses,” or “restaurants” that
“improper[ly] dispos[ed] of garbage.”78 Had the City criminalized a
wider range of animal-harming practices (including, but not limited
to, the ritual slaughter of animals), its law would have qualified as
more “generally applicable” and thus less constitutionally
problematic. But because the City had not pursued its interests by
way of a more restrictive means, its ordinances ran afoul of the Free
Exercise Clause.79 Or, as Justice Blackmun stated in a separate
opinion, “[i]f the State’s goal is important enough to prohibit
religiously motivated activity, it will not and must not stop at
religiously motivated activity.”80
As in the free speech context, however, the Court has not always
treated the availability of a more restrictive alternative as fatal to the
constitutionality of a religion-related law. In Locke v. Davey,81
decided some eleven years after Lukumi, the Court upheld a
Washington scholarship program that specifically excluded students
of devotional theology.82 Invoking Smith, the Court held the program

76. Id. at 543.
77. Id. at 543–44.
78. Id. at 544.
79. Id. at 567–77.
80. Id. at 578–79 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Lower courts, too, have embraced
similar reasoning in the Free Exercise context, faulting the government for its failure to
pursue a regulatory objective in a sufficiently restrictive manner. See, e.g., Fraternal Order
of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 366 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting
that a police department’s willingness to grant medical exemptions from a policy
prohibiting officers from wearing beards undercut its justifications for refusing to grant
religious exemptions from the policy). For a helpful overview of such cases, see generally
Duncan, supra note 11, at 868–83 (noting that Lukumi made “underinclusion” an
“earmark[] of laws which, although facially neutral with respect to religion, nonetheless
fail to satisfy the general applicability requirement”).
81. 540 U.S. 712 (2003).
82. Id. at 725.
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did not target religion in a problematic way. That was so, the Court
explained, because Washington could justify the theology exclusion
by reference to a valid state interest in avoiding the “establishment”
or endorsement of religion over nonreligion.83 This “historic and
substantial” interest in avoiding an improper establishment of religion
was sufficient to defeat the conclusion that state’s scholarship
program was “inherently constitutionally suspect” on Free Exercise
grounds.84
The Court’s reasoning in Davey highlighted the inadequacy of
various less restrictive alternatives to the program under review: if the
state were to afford more generous treatment to devotional theology
students, the Court explained, its “antiestablishment” aims would
necessarily be compromised.85 But, as Justice Scalia pointed out in his
dissent, the Court never explored the alternative possibility of a more
restrictive approach to the problem—specifically, Washington might
instead have avoided Establishment Clause difficulties by simply
terminating the scholarship program in its entirety.86 If the state were
truly serious about disassociating itself from religious instruction, it
could have exited the educational arena altogether—thus avoiding
the provision of both direct support and indirect support of
institutions that did in fact promote various religious beliefs.87 Thus,
much as the Court did in Lukumi, it might have done (but did not do)
in Davey—fault the state for its failure to pursue its regulatory
interests in a sufficiently restrictive manner.
C. Equal Protection
In contrast to its First Amendment decisions, the Court’s equal
protection decisions have only infrequently relied on more restrictive
means analysis to strike down constitutionally suspect laws. But such
analysis is not entirely absent from the case law. Consider, for
instance, the majority opinion in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living

83. Id. at 724–25.
84. Id. at 725.
85. Id. at 721–22.
86. Id. at 728–29 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The State could also simply abandon the
scholarship program altogether. If that seems a dear price to pay for freedom of
conscience, it is only because the State has defined that freedom so broadly that it would
be offended by a program with such an incidental, indirect religious effect.”).
87. See Antony Barone Kolenc, “Mr. Scalia’s Neighborhood”: A Home for Minority
Religions?, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 819, 851 (2007) (noting that Justice Scalia’s reasoning in
Davey “could lead government officials to take actions that amount to less funding for
religious programs across the board”).
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Center.88 A municipal zoning ordinance required the issuance of a
“special use permit” for the operation of group homes for individuals
with mental disabilities.89 Having been denied such a permit, the
plaintiffs challenged the rule under the Equal Protection Clause,
claiming that it unlawfully discriminated on the basis of disability.90
Although the Court declined to treat the law’s classification as
“suspect” or “quasi-suspect,”91 it nonetheless struck down the law, via
the application of what commentators would later call “rational basis
with bite” review.92 In so doing, the Court made short shrift of a
variety of proffered justifications for the City’s permitting scheme,
focusing first and foremost on the City’s relatively more lenient
treatment of other parties not before the Court.93 For example, the
City had claimed an interest in protecting group home residents from
the risk of a flood; but this argument would not do, the Court held,
because it could not support the law’s “distinction between the
Featherston home and, for example, nursing homes, homes for
convalescents or the aged, or sanitariums or hospitals, any of which
could be located on the Featherston site without obtaining a special
use permit.”94 Similarly, the City expressed a concern about “the legal
responsibility for actions” that the home’s residents might take.95 But
that argument failed, given the lack of permitting requirements
demanded of boarding houses and fraternity houses.96 Additionally,
the City expressed concern about the size of the home and the large
number of its residents. But that argument foundered on the
complete absence of restrictions for “boarding house[s], nursing
home[s], family dwelling[s], fraternity house[s], or dormitor[ies].”97
Finally, the City defended its permit denial as “aimed at avoiding
concentration of population and at lessening congestion of the
streets.”98 But again, “[t]hese concerns obviously fail to explain why
apartment houses, fraternity and sorority houses, hospitals and the
like, may freely locate in the area without a permit.”99 In short,
88. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
89. Id. at 435.
90. Id. at 437.
91. Id. at 442–47.
92. Id. at 447–50; see also Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite:
Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 793–96 (1987).
93. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447.
94. Id. at 449.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 450.
99. Id.
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virtually every time the City claimed an interest on behalf of its
permitting decision, the Court responded by identifying a more
restrictive alternative that the City had chosen not to pursue.100
Consider also the recent litigation concerning the
constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans. The Court itself did not
invoke more restrictive alternatives in holding that such bans violated
the Constitution,101 but some lower courts did do so while teeing the
issue up for Supreme Court review. In striking down two such laws
from Wisconsin and Indiana, for instance, the Seventh Circuit placed
special emphasis on these states’ failure to withhold marriage benefits
from sterile, opposite-sex couples—a failure that undercut the states’
attempt to characterize their marriage laws as devices designed to
deal with the aftermath of “accidental” pregnancies.102 In striking
down a similar Virginia law, the Fourth Circuit pointed out that the
state’s continued willingness to recognize the marriages of infertile
opposite-sex couples rendered its same-sex marriage restriction
“woefully underinclusive.”103 Other courts have reached similar
conclusions.104 In sum, the pre-Obergefell cases often found fault in
the states’ refusal to extend their prohibitions on marriage as far as
the stated justifications for those prohibitions would have demanded.
But more restrictive alternatives have not always paved the way
to equal protection success. In Michael M. v. Superior Court,105 for
instance, the Court waved away a posited more restrictive alternative
in a California law that made it a crime for underage males (but not
underage females) to engage in non-marital sexual intercourse with
100. Id. at 448–50; see also Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered
Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945, 955 (2004) (noting that “the Court implied that the
extraordinarily underinclusive nature of the classification so poorly served the ostensible
purposes of concern about the number of residents and the home’s location on a flood
plain that it freed the Court from reliance on such hypothetical purposes”).
101. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597–605 (2015).
102. See Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 661 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The state treats married
homosexuals as would-be ‘free riders’ on heterosexual marriage, unreasonably reaping
benefits intended by the state for fertile couples. But infertile couples are free riders too.
Why are they allowed to reap the benefits accorded marriages of fertile couples, and
homosexuals are not?”).
103. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 381 (4th Cir. 2014) (“If Virginia sought to ensure
responsible procreation via the Virginia Marriage Laws, the laws are woefully
underinclusive. Same-sex couples are not the only category of couples who cannot
reproduce accidentally. For example, opposite-sex couples cannot procreate
unintentionally if they include a post-menopausal woman or an individual with a medical
condition that prevents unassisted conception.”).
104. See, e.g., Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1081 (10th Cir. 2014) (“And Oklahoma
permits infertile opposite-sex couples to marry despite the fact that they, as much as samesex couples, might raise non-biological children.”).
105. 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (plurality opinion).
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another underage party.106 No one on the Court appeared to dispute
the importance of the interest asserted on behalf of the law—namely,
that of “preventing [out-of-wedlock teenage] pregnancies”—nor did
the Justices disagree that the prohibition helped to achieve that
interest to some extent.107 What was disputed was whether the state
could justifiably exempt underage females from the prohibition—
whether, in other words, the state should be faulted for its failure to
pursue the more restrictive alternative of a gender-neutral prohibition
on underage sex.108
Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion answered no, for two
separate reasons. First, Justice Rehnquist credited the state’s
assertion that a male-only prohibition helped to “equalize” burdens
across the sexes.109 Since “virtually all of the significant harmful and
inescapably identifiable consequences of teenage pregnancy fall on
the young female,” legally imposed (and male-exclusive) burdens of
criminal punishment approximated some of the physically imposed
(and female-exclusive) burdens of an unwanted pregnancy.110 And
second, Rehnquist accepted the state’s contentions that a more
restrictive means might prove less effective at deterring the
prohibited behavior.111 More specifically,
[the State’s] view is that a female is surely less likely to report
violations of the statute if she herself would be subject to
criminal prosecution. In an area already fraught with
prosecutorial difficulties, we decline to hold that the Equal
Protection Clause requires a legislature to enact a statute so
broad that it may well be incapable of enforcement.112
Thus, the plurality found itself “unable to accept petitioner’s
contention that the statute . . . must, in order to pass judicial scrutiny,
be broadened so as to hold the female as criminally liable as the
male.”113
The Court was similarly dismissive of more restrictive
alternatives when, in Nguyen v. INS,114 it upheld a set of gender-based
rules governing the citizenship claims of children born abroad to

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 464.
See id. at 470; id. at 490–91 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 490–91 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 473 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 473.
Id. at 473–74.
Id. at 473–74 (internal footnotes omitted).
Id.
533 U.S. 53 (2001).
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unmarried couples of mixed citizenship.115 The terms of the law varied
depending on whether the “citizen-parent” of the child—i.e., the
member of the couple with U.S. citizenship—was male or female,
with children of citizen-fathers subject to more onerous procedural
and evidentiary requirements than children of citizen-mothers.116 The
government defended this scheme on the ground that citizen-fathers
presented special evidentiary difficulties that citizen-mothers did
not,117 but that argument invited an obvious retort: Even if citizenfathers posed special problems, why not subject both citizen-mother
and citizen-father claims to the more onerous set of requirements that
only the latter currently received?118 Why not, in other words, simply
require the government to pursue its interests by way of a more
restrictive alternative—one that simply imposed on citizen-mother
children the heightened set of requirements that citizen-father
children already faced?
To this question, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion offered two
brief responses. The first centered on regulatory difficulties:
expanding the evidentiary demands on everyone, Justice Kennedy
suggested, would increase “the subjectivity, intrusiveness, and
difficulties of proof that might attend an inquiry into any particular
bond or tie.”119 Congress was therefore entitled to maintain the more
“easily administered scheme” it had chosen to put in place.120 Second,
the majority observed that heightening the evidentiary burdens on
citizen-mother children “would be to insist on a hollow neutrality,”
given that a “facially neutral rule would sometimes require fathers to
take additional affirmative steps which would not be required of
mothers.”121 The real “biological differences” that existed between
115. Id. at 71.
116. Id. at 59–60.
117. Among other things, as the Court pointed out, “proof of motherhood” was
“inherent in birth itself” whereas proof of fatherhood was not, and that fact would, on
average, make citizen-mother relationships easier to verify. Id. at 62–64.
118. See id. at 79 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority opinion “casually
dismisses the relevance of available sex-neutral alternatives”). Just recently, the Court
struck down the INA’s application of different residency requirements for the children of
unwed citizen-fathers and the children of unwed citizen-mothers. Sessions v. MoralesSantana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1686 (2017). In so doing, however, the Court reaffirmed its
earlier decision in Nguyen, observing that “imposing a paternal-acknowledgement
requirement on fathers [is] a justifiable, easily met means of ensuring the existence of a
biological parent-child relationship, which the mother establishes by giving birth.” Id. at
1694.
119. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 69.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 64. For example, Justice Kennedy noted that while Congress “could have
required both mothers and fathers to prove parenthood within 30 days or, for that matter,
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men and women, in other words, would likely render formally neutral
rules non-neutral in effect, and that fact helped to excuse Congress’s
failure to process immigration applications in a more restrictive
manner.122
The Court assumed a similarly dismissive attitude toward more
restrictive means analysis in Rostker v. Goldberg,123 in which it upheld
the male-only registration requirements of the federal Selective
Service Act.124 True, the Court acknowledged, Congress might have
pursued its interest in “raising and supporting armies” through the
“alternative means” of requiring both men and women to register for
the draft,125 but that fact did not doom the gender-based requirements
under review.126 Among other things, the Court explained, the more
restrictive alternative might turn out to serve the government’s
interest less well.127 For example, the legislative record had revealed
concerns that “training would be needlessly burdened by women
recruits who could not be used in combat,”128 that “administrative
problems such as housing and different treatment with regard to
dependency, hardship and physical standards would also exist,”129 and
that “staffing non-combat positions with women during a
mobilization would be positively detrimental to the important goal of
military flexibility.”130 Thus, the Court concluded the less restrictive,
male-only draft was justified for the simple reason that “Congress
simply did not consider it worth the added burdens of including
women in draft and registration plans.”131
D. Substantive Due Process
The Court has sometimes employed more restrictive means
analysis when evaluating privacy- and autonomy-related claims under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Consider, for
instance, Justice Powell’s plurality opinion in Moore v. City of East
18 years, of the child’s birth,” it would nonetheless remain true that mothers’ names
always “will appear on the on the birth certificate as a result of their presence at the
birth,” whereas fathers’ names would not always appear on the birth certificate. Id.
122. Id.
123. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
124. Id. at 83.
125. Id. at 70.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 76–77.
128. Id. at 81 (quoting S. Rep. No. 96-226, at 9 (1979)).
129. Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 96-826, at 159 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2612, 2649).
130. Id. at 81–82.
131. Id. at 81.
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Cleveland.132 An East Cleveland housing ordinance forbade
cohabitation by non-family members and further defined “family” to
exclude a variety of non-nuclear familial relationships.133 The Court
invalidated the law as an unconstitutional abridgement of “choices
concerning family living arrangements.”134 Key to this determination
was the plurality’s conclusion that the ordinance bore only a “tenuous
relation” to the “legitimate goals” of “preventing overcrowding,”
“minimizing traffic and parking congestion,” and “avoiding an undue
financial burden on East Cleveland’s school system.”135 Justice Powell
did not dispute that these goals were legitimate or that the
cohabitation restrictions bore some connection to them.136 The
problem for East Cleveland lay in its unduly permissive treatment of
persons not covered by the law.137 For example, “the ordinance
permits any family consisting only of husband, wife, and unmarried
children to live together, even if the family contains a half dozen
licensed drivers, each with his or her own car.”138 In addition, “[t]he
ordinance would permit a grandmother to live with a single
dependent son and children, even if his school age children number a
dozen.”139 The law’s failure to police overcrowding more aggressively
thus contributed to the plurality’s finding that it was unconstitutional
as written.
Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman140 advanced
an argument along similar lines.141 Having concluded that a
Connecticut contraceptive ban implicated fundamental liberty
interests,142 Justice Harlan went on to ask whether the ban might
nonetheless be justified in light of the state’s countervailing interests
in promoting morality.143 The answer, Harlan reasoned, was an
emphatic no.144 Nothing the state had argued “even remotely suggests
a justification for the obnoxiously intrusive means it has chosen to

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

431 U.S. 494 (1977).
Id. at 498–99.
Id. at 499.
Id. at 499–500.
Id. at 500.
Id.
Id.
Id.
367 U.S. 497 (1961).
Id. at 522 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 548, 554 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 554 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id.
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effectuate [the] policy.”145 And this was so in part due to the state’s
lackadaisical enforcement of the law itself.146 As Harlan put the point,
the very circumstance that Connecticut has not chosen to press
the enforcement of this statute against individual users, while it
nevertheless persists in asserting its right to do so at any time—
in effect a right to hold this statute as an imminent threat to the
privacy of the households of the State—conduces to the
inference either that it does not consider the policy of the
statute a very important one, or that it does not regard the
means it has chosen for its effectuation as appropriate or
necessary.147
In Harlan’s view, then, the unused, more restrictive alternative of a
regularly enforced contraceptive ban severely undercut Connecticut’s
justifications for the law under review.148
Consider finally the Court’s response to Texas’s claim in Roe v.
Wade149 that its prohibition on abortions helped to safeguard the
Fourteenth Amendment rights of unborn fetuses.150 Although the
Court’s refutation of the argument relied primarily on textual
considerations, Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion also pointed to
various non-restrictive features of the Texas law as further militating
against the state’s argument.151 In particular
[w]hen Texas urges that a fetus is entitled to Fourteenth
Amendment protection as a person, it faces a dilemma. Neither
in Texas nor in any other State are all abortions prohibited.
Despite broad proscription, an exception always exists. The
exception contained in Art. 1196, for an abortion procured or
attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life
of the mother, is typical. But if the fetus is a person who is not
to be deprived of life without due process of law, and if the
mother’s condition is the sole determinant, does not the Texas
145. Id.
146. The majority in Poe had dismissed the case on ripeness grounds, pointing to the
absence of any recorded prosecutions under the statute over an eighty-year period. Id. at
508 (majority opinion).
147. Id. at 554 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 535–37. For a similar argument linking an absence of regular enforcement
with a presumption of substantive unconstitutionality, see, for example, Pamela S. Karlan,
Foreword: Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1447, 1453 (2004) (noting that “the fact
that states make virtually no effort to enforce criminal prohibitions on private gay sexual
activity makes it implausible to see the statutes as actually directed at the acts
themselves”).
149. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
150. Id. at 156–59.
151. Id. at 157–59.
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exception appear to be out of line with the Amendment’s
command?152
Additional features of the Texas law struck the majority as not
restrictive enough to sustain the state’s “life of the fetus” justification:
Texas law, for instance, did not treat the woman as “a principal or an
accomplice with respect to an abortion upon her.”153 But, the Court
asked, “[i]f the fetus is a person, why is the woman not a principal or
an accomplice?”154 And finally, the majority observed that Texas
penalized criminal abortion far less severely than it penalized criminal
murder. Again, however, it wondered: “[i]f the fetus is a person, may
the penalties be different?”155 In all these respects, then, the Court in
Roe appeared to suggest that Texas’s failure to enact a more
restrictive abortion ban—one without a “life of the mother”
exception, one that extended accomplice liability to the mother, and
one that employed harsher penalties—contributed to the
unconstitutionality of the less restrictive ban under review.156
E. Dormant Commerce Clause
The “dormant” or “negative” Commerce Clause prohibits states
from erecting protectionist barriers to the free flow of interstate
commerce.157 Implementing this requirement, the Court has applied a
“virtually per se rule of invalidity”158 to laws that discriminate
between in-state and out-of-state parties. Under this rule, a facially
discriminatory law survives attack only if “it advances a legitimate
local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable

152. Id. at 157–58 n.54.
153. Id. at 158 n.54.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 157–58, 158 n.54. To be clear, the Court’s argument on this point was not
without difficulties. See, e.g., Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense of the (Equal)
Protection Clause: Subsequent Interpretation and Application, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J.
219, 299–301 (2009) (noting that “[w]hen one remembers that the Amendment has a state
action requirement, it is not at all clear why constitutional personhood for a human fetus
would require the state to prohibit abortion,” while also proposing a “duty to protect”
reading of the Fourteenth Amendment that would help to “fill the gap in Roe’s
reasoning”). But what is significant for our purposes is simply that the Court in Roe
attempted such an analytical move, invoking a hypothetical more restrictive alternative for
the purpose of highlighting a constitutional defect in a less restrictive law. Roe, 410 U.S. at
157–58 n.54.
157. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623–24 (1978)
(“[W]here simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per
se rule of invalidity has been erected.”).
158. Id.
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nondiscriminatory alternatives.”159 Consequently, the Court has
sometimes pointed to the existence of a more restrictive means as a
reason to invalidate a law under the “virtually per se rule.”160 When a
state can achieve its “legitimate local objectives” by worsening its
treatment of in-state parties, the Court will often have reason to
strike down the facially discriminatory law under attack.
In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,161 for instance, the Court
invalidated a New Jersey prohibition on the in-state disposal of outof-state waste.162 Resisting the charge that it had engaged in
impermissible economic protectionism, New Jersey characterized the
law as a legitimate exercise of the state’s police powers, designed to
protect New Jersey citizens from the health-and environmentalhazards of overflowing landfills.163 But the Court rejected this
argument, pointing to the possibility of utilizing other, facially neutral
means of achieving those aims.164 In particular, as the Court observed,
rather than simply target out-of-state garbage, “New Jersey may
pursue those ends by slowing the flow of all waste into the State’s
remaining landfills, even though interstate commerce may
incidentally be affected.”165 Restating the point less charitably, Justice
Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion highlighted the majority’s
wholehearted embrace of more restrictive means analysis:
New Jersey must either prohibit all landfill operations, leaving
itself to cast about for a presently nonexistent solution to the
serious problem of disposing of the waste generated within its
own borders, or it must accept waste from every portion of the
United States, thereby multiplying the health and safety
problems which would result if it dealt only with such wastes
generated within the state.166
On the majority’s view, that is, New Jersey could achieve its health
and safety interests in the more restrictive fashion of abolishing all
landfills from its territory, and therefore its facially discriminatory

159. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988).
160. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624.
161. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
162. Id. at 629.
163. Id. at 625.
164. Id. at 626–27.
165. Id. at 626.
166. Id. at 631 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt,
504 U.S. 334, 349 (1992) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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(but less restrictive) enactment could not pass constitutional
muster.167
A more recent decision from the Fourth Circuit, Beskind v.
Ealey,168 relied even more explicitly on more restrictive means
analysis in striking down a facially discriminatory law.169 North
Carolina’s Alcoholic Beverage Control (“ABC”) laws imposed a
complex set of restrictions on the importation of wine by out-of-state
wineries.170 A consequence of the regulatory scheme was that in-state
wineries could sell their products “directly” to in-state customers
(thereby bypassing wholesalers and retailers altogether), whereas outof-state wineries generally could not.171 North Carolina defended the
distinction by highlighting the difficulty of enforcing taxation
requirements and other provisions of its ABC laws against out-ofstate actors: by channeling all out-of-state wine to in-state sellers, the
argument went, North Carolina could more easily ensure that the outof-state wineries were in compliance with all of the relevant state-law
restrictions.172 But even if this were true, the Fourth Circuit pointed
out, there existed an obviously nondiscriminatory means of achieving
North Carolina’s desired ends: namely, “requir[ing] in-state wines to
pass through the same three-tiered scheme that all other wines must
pass through.”173 North Carolina had argued the case as if the only
nondiscriminatory alternative on the table involved extending to outof-state wineries the same lenient regulatory treatment that it already
extended to in-state wineries.174 But that was not the only option.
Because North Carolina had been “unable to explain why imposing
the same restrictions on in-state wineries that it imposes on out-ofstate wineries would not be a reasonable nondiscriminatory
alternative,” the facially discriminatory provisions of the ABC law
could not be sustained.175

167. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626; see also Paul E. McGreal, The Flawed
Economics of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191, 1257 (1998)
(suggesting that the City of Philadelphia’s apparent embrace of more-restrictive-means
analysis “created a perverse incentive toward a national waste crisis”).
168. 325 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2003).
169. Id. at 516–17, 520.
170. Id. at 510.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 516.
173. Id. at 515.
174. Id. at 515–16.
175. Id. at 516. The Court gestured towards a similar argument in Granholm v. Heald,
544 U.S. 460 (2005), in which it struck down a similar set of wine-importation restrictions
that New York and Michigan had each adopted. Id. at 490. The states defended the
restrictions by invoking an interest in preventing underage drinking: by prohibiting direct
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Consider by contrast the Court’s decision in Maine v. Taylor,176
which upheld a facially discriminatory restriction on interstate
commerce.177 Maine prohibited the importation of live baitfish from
outside the state, citing an interest in protecting its local aquatic
ecology against the threats posed by non-native species.178 Much of
the Court’s analysis centered on the viability of various less restrictive
alternatives that the challengers had proposed. The challengers had
argued, for instance, that the state could allow the importation of live
baitfish while inspecting out-of-state shipments for parasitic and nonnative species.179 The Court, however, found that these sorts of
inspections posed practical difficulties that rendered them
unworkable. Hence, the Maine law could stand because it “serve[d]
legitimate local purposes that could not adequately be served by
available nondiscriminatory alternatives.”180
Curiously absent from the Court’s opinion was any analysis of
more restrictive alternatives to the Maine baitfish law. Among these
alternatives might have been a law that simply banned the sale
(and/or use) of any and all live baitfish, whether or not imported into
the state of Maine. Interstate baitfish sales would have remained
prohibited, thus leaving Maine’s waterways equally well insulated
against the special threats posed by non-native species. But purely instate baitfish sales would also have been prohibited, thus alleviating
the problem of facial discrimination. That solution, to be sure, might
well have been problematic for other reasons: perhaps it would have
harmed the Maine fishing industry (and thus, by extension, the Maine
economy as a whole) or perhaps it would still have proven unduly
discriminatory in effect. But similar concerns were present in
Philadelphia v. New Jersey181 and the Beskind182 case, and it is not
sales from out-of-state wineries, their laws made it more difficult for minors to procure
alcohol over the Internet, where they could more easily misrepresent their age. Id. at 489.
But this argument, as the Court pointed out, faced an obvious problem: “minors are just as
likely to order wine from in-state producers as from out-of-state ones.” Id. at 490. Given
that New York and Michigan already enabled in-state wineries to sell their product
directly to consumers, minors could thwart the state’s regulatory objectives by simply
channeling all of their online orders to in-state wineries instead. Id. at 490. The implication
was thus clear: To the extent the states were genuinely concerned about preventing
underage drinking, an obviously more restrictive alternative was available to serve that
interest—namely, that of subjecting both in-state and out-of-state wineries to the same
elevated sets of restrictions that only the latter endured. Id.
176. 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
177. Id. at 151–52.
178. See id. at 133.
179. See id. at 147.
180. Id. at 151.
181. See supra notes 161–67 and accompanying text.
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immediately obvious why Maine v. Taylor should have come out any
differently.183 A total baitfish ban, after all, would have significantly
reduced discriminatory treatment of in-state and out-of-state baitfish
producers without in any way jeopardizing the state’s ability to
protect its waterways against the introduction of non-native species.
Even so, the Court in Maine v. Taylor never appeared to consider this
possibility.184
F. Equal Sovereignty
One byway of constitutional federalism doctrine involves the socalled “equal sovereignty” principle, which generally condemns the
enactment of federal laws that treat some jurisdictions differently
from others.185 The future of this principle remains uncertain—the
Court leaned heavily on it in Shelby County v. Holder186 but without
providing much detail as to (a) the scope of its operation, and (b) the
applicable level of scrutiny triggered by laws that accord “disparate
treatment of States.”187 But the doctrine plainly demands some level
of means/ends fit manifested by laws that treat states unequally, such
that courts now must ask whether differential treatment of state (and
perhaps local) jurisdictions is sufficiently tailored to achieve a
sufficiently important federal interest.188 That methodology brings
182. See supra notes 168–75 and accompanying text.
183. Cf. Maine, 477 U.S. at 153 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he invocation of
environmental protection or public health has never been thought to confer some kind of
special dispensation from the general principle of nondiscrimination in interstate
commerce.”).
184. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV also imposes constitutional
limits on states’ ability to discriminate against out-of-state actors, and here too the Court
has occasionally invoked more restrictive alternatives in the course of invalidating a
discriminatory state law. In Supreme Court v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985), for instance, the
Court struck down a New Hampshire law that generally excluded nonresidents from the
state bar association. Id. at 288. In an attempt to justify the law, New Hampshire invoked
an interest in ensuring that members of the bar maintained a continued familiarity with
“local rules and procedures.” Id. at 285. But the law was underinclusive with respect to this
interest, because as it still “permit[ted] lawyers who move[d] away from the State to retain
their membership in the bar.” Id. at 285 n.19. In that way, the more restrictive alternative
of a categorical ban on nonresident bar membership helped to demonstrate the
unconstitutionality of the “less restrictive” residency requirement that New Hampshire
had adopted.
185. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2618, 2623–24 (2013).
186. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
187. Id. at 2623–24.
188. See Thomas B. Colby, In Defense of the Equal Sovereignty Principle, 65 DUKE L.J.
1087, 1155–56 (2016); see also Zachary S. Price, NAMUDNO’s Non-Existent Principle of
State Equality, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 24, 26 (2013) (noting that “[t]he implication [of
the equal sovereignty principle] would seem to be that heightened scrutiny applies to
legislation that treats states unequally”).
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along with it the possibility that more restrictive means analysis might
sometimes enter into the equal sovereignty calculus. When Congress
could just as well achieve its interests by increasing, rather than
decreasing, the regulatory burdens on states it has singled out for
favorable treatment, should that possibility militate in favor of
invalidating the less burdensome, but more discriminatory, law under
attack?
The Third Circuit briefly entertained a question of this sort when
confronting a constitutional challenge to the federal Professional and
Amateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”).189 PASPA outlaws
sports betting across the United States, while exempting Nevada,
Delaware, Oregon, and Montana from the full force of its
prohibitions.190 New Jersey challenged the law, relying in part on an
equal sovereignty argument. The law violated the equal sovereignty
of the states, New Jersey claimed, by according special treatment to a
select handful of state jurisdictions. The court rejected this argument
on several grounds, one of which involved the claim that PASPA’s
interstate discrimination was justified in light of the purposes it was
meant to serve.191 New Jersey’s argument to the contrary was
straightforward—if the aim of PASPA was to eliminate the evils of
sports gambling, then any state-specific carve-out made no sense. A
far more effective—and nondiscriminatory alternative—would have
been a more restrictive law that prohibited sports gambling
everywhere.
The court’s response to this claim was twofold. First, it
contended that New Jersey had “distort[ed] PASPA’s purpose as
being to wipe out sports gambling altogether.”192 Rather, the true
purpose of the law was “to stop the spread of state-sanctioned sports
gambling,” in light of which “regulating states in which sportswagering already existed would have been irrational.”193 Prohibiting
gambling in all states would not have promoted this “anti-spreading”

189. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 214 (3d Cir.
2013).
190. The scope of the carve-out varies within each of the exempted states, with the
statute permitting only those forms of sports betting that the state had authorized prior to
PASPA’s enactment. See Thomas B. Colby, Revitalizing the Forgotten Uniformity
Constraint on the Commerce Power, 91 VA. L. REV. 249, 250 n.3 (2005).
191. The court also reasoned that the equal sovereignty principle did not apply with
full force to laws enacted pursuant to the commerce power and/or touching on matters
“outside the context of ‘sensitive areas of state and local policymaking.’” Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, 730 F.3d at 238–39 (quoting Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2624).
192. Id. at 239.
193. Id.
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interest any more effectively, given that the exempted states had
already sanctioned sports-gambling as of the date of PASPA’s
enactment. Second, the court questioned the sincerity of New Jersey’s
own position. New Jersey, after all, had not asked the court to
invalidate PASPA’s carve-out for exempted states, but it had instead
asked the court to invalidate PASPA in its entirety (thus, in effect,
leaving states free to permit sports-gambling everywhere).194 New
Jersey, the court contended, was trying to have its cake and eat it too:
invoking the existence of a more restrictive alternative as a means of
obtaining its preferred remedy of a less restrictive regulatory regime.
“That New Jersey seeks Nevada’s preferential treatment,” as the
court put it, “and not a complete ban on the preferences,” thus
“undermines [its] invocation of the equal sovereignty doctrine.”195
The foregoing discussion reveals, if nothing else, that courts have
taken a wide variety of approaches to more restrictive means analysis
in adjudicating constitutional cases. Inconsistencies have emerged
both within and across different doctrinal fields: sometimes courts
have faulted government actors for failing to pursue a given
regulatory objective in a more restrictive manner, and sometimes
courts have excused them from doing so. And still other times courts
have simply ignored the issue altogether. This hodgepodge of results
suggests that courts lack a systematic framework for thinking through
the question of when, if ever, the relative lenience of a legal measure
should function as a reason for its invalidation. The remainder of this
Article thus attempts to develop such a framework, while also
offering prescriptive insights about the implementation of more
restrictive means analysis in future cases.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPORT OF MORE RESTRICTIVE
ALTERNATIVES
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, more restrictive
alternatives are typically invoked in response to the government’s
claim that a given regulatory interest justifies the enactment of a
constitutionally suspect law. The aim, in other words, is to
demonstrate an insufficient means/ends fit between the law being
challenged and the interests it is said to serve. But how, in particular,
does a more restrictive alternative serve to accomplish this goal?
What is the underlying logic supporting the connection between the

194. See id.
195. Id.
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availability of a more restrictive alternative, and the conclusion that
the less restrictive law fails to pass constitutional muster?
This Part suggests that more restrictive alternatives might
support at least one of two different types of attacks on a
constitutionally suspect law. First, a more restrictive alternative might
support an equality-based attack on the law, which purports to show
that the government has unnecessarily utilized a disfavored form of
discriminatory treatment to pursue interests that it could just as well
achieve in a nondiscriminatory fashion. Second, a more restrictive
alternative might support a sincerity-based argument against the law,
which, by showing how much more effectively the more restrictive
alternative could achieve a stated regulatory interest, functions to cast
doubt on the government’s actual commitment to the interest it has
invoked. Put differently, the equality-based argument faults the
government for needlessly discriminating, whereas the sincerity-based
argument faults the government for failing to pursue its interests with
sufficient vigor and aggressiveness. These two arguments, to be sure,
may sometimes overlap. But they will often rest on different
assumptions regarding the constitutional significance of a more
restrictive alternative and raise different implications regarding the
range of options available to the government in rebutting a
challenger’s claims.
A. The Equality-Based Argument
With one exception,196 the doctrines considered in the previous
Part share the following important feature: each doctrine singles out
for heightened means/ends scrutiny a form of regulatory treatment
that discriminates on the basis of a constitutionally suspect criterion.
In the free speech context, for instance, the Court has held that
content-based laws trigger strict scrutiny, whereas content-neutral
laws trigger intermediate scrutiny.197 In the free exercise context, the
Court has distinguished between religion-targeting laws, which trigger
strict scrutiny, and laws that are neutral and generally applicable with
respect to religion, which trigger no free-exercise scrutiny at all.198 In
the equal protection context, the Court applies strict scrutiny to laws
that employ suspect classifications such as race and alienage; it applies
intermediate scrutiny to laws that discriminate on the basis of gender;
and it applies rational basis scrutiny to laws that discriminate on the

196. See supra Section II.D (discussing substantive due process doctrine).
197. See supra Section II.A.
198. See supra Section II.B.
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basis of some other non-suspect classification.199 Dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine calls for heightened scrutiny of laws that distinguish
between out-of-state parties and in-state parties.200 And the equal
sovereignty principle at least sometimes requires a more searching
examination of means/ends fit when a federal law draws distinctions
based on the identities of certain states.201
This Article earlier posited a connection between more
restrictive alternatives and nondiscriminatory alternatives, noting that
governments can eliminate constitutionally suspect forms of
discrimination by worsening a law’s regulatory treatment of a
previously advantaged category of conduct. Absolute increases in
restrictiveness can in this way alleviate relative disparities in
treatment. And when those disparities are themselves constitutionally
suspect, more restrictive (and nondiscriminatory) alternatives can
deliver the constitutional benefit of promoting formal equality where
formal inequality previously prevailed. From this observation, it is not
difficult to identify one mechanism through which the existence of a
more restrictive alternative helps to demonstrate the constitutional
invalidity of a less restrictive law. Simply put, the more restrictive
alternative highlights the non-necessity of discrimination.202 Precisely
because the more restrictive alternative provides a nondiscriminatory
way to pursue the government’s goal, it functions to defeat the
government’s claim that the goal itself warrants a facially problematic
form of discriminatory treatment.
Consider R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul. The majority struck down a
content-based ban on a subcategory of fighting words by pointing to
the availability of a more restrictive alternative—namely, a contentneutral ban on all fighting words.203 St. Paul defended its ban by
199. See supra Section II.C.
200. See supra Section II.E.
201. See supra Section II.F.
202. In this sense, claims of equality-based defectiveness capitalize on what Richard
Fallon has characterized the “necessity prong” of the narrow-tailoring inquiry, which
“insists that ‘infringements of protected rights must be necessary in order to be justified.’”
Fallon, supra note 2, at 1326. Professor Fallon notes that the Court sometimes “expresses
. . . the same demand when it says that the government’s chosen means must be the ‘least
restrictive alternative’ that would achieve its goals.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542
U.S. 356, 366 (2004)). But insofar as the “protected right” incorporates a
nondiscrimination norm, the necessity prong might also proceed via inquiry into the
availability of more restrictive alternatives.
203. The Court’s use of the terms “content-neutral alternative” in R.A.V. reflected
something of an oversimplification. What the Court in R.A.V. termed a “content-neutral
alternative” remained “content-based” in its own way; even a universal ban on “fighting
words” still would have drawn a content-based distinction between words of the “fighting”
and “non-fighting” variety. Nevertheless, and unlike the law that St. Paul had adopted, the
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reference to an interest in “ensur[ing] the basic human rights of
members of groups that have historically been subjected to
discrimination.”204 The majority acknowledged that the city had a
compelling state interest in pursuing this goal, but it reasoned that a
content-neutral “fighting words” ban—i.e., a ban that covered all
fighting words including but not limited to those based on race, color,
creed, religion, or gender—would “have [had] precisely the same
beneficial effect” in terms of the interest being sought.205 And given
that the “dispositive question” in the case was whether “content
discrimination is reasonably necessary to achieve St. Paul’s
compelling interests,” the more restrictive (but nondiscriminatory)
alternative effectively sealed the fate of the less restrictive (but
discriminatory) law.206 Content discrimination was not reasonably
related to St. Paul’s compelling government interests, because a
nondiscriminatory, more restrictive alternative stood ready to achieve
those interests in an equally “beneficial” way.
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Beskind v. Easley—the wine
importation case—utilized more restrictive means analysis in a similar
fashion.207 Under well-established rules of dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine, states cannot facially discriminate against interstate
commerce unless there exists no “reasonable nondiscriminatory
alternative” capable of advancing the “legitimate local purpose”
furthered by the law under review.208 In Beskind, North Carolina had
attempted to justify its differential treatment of in-state wineries and
out-of-state wineries by reference to a “legitimate local purpose” in
preventing out-of-state wineries from circumventing various
distribution and taxation requirements.209 But, as the Fourth Circuit
pointed out, North Carolina could continue to achieve that interest by
subjecting in-state wineries to the more burdensome regulatory
treatment that the effective regulation of out-of-state wineries was
said to require.210 That regulatory scheme would have been
more restrictive alternative still would have utilized a special form of contentdiscrimination that the doctrine expressly permitted—namely, the content-based targeting
of an entire category of unprotected speech. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
383–84 (1992). Thus, the more restrictive alternative of a categorical “fighting words”
prohibition, even though content-based in a technical sense, still would not have
discriminated in a constitutionally problematic manner.
204. Id. at 395.
205. Id. at 396.
206. Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 516 (4th Cir. 2003).
207. Id. at 516.
208. See, e.g., Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 101 (1994).
209. Beskind, 325 F.3d at 515 (quoting Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 100–01).
210. Id.
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nondiscriminatory, and it would have served the state’s regulatory
objectives in no less an effective way. And that was enough to
condemn the state’s law in its current form. As the Fourth Circuit put
it, the question in the case was not “whether North Carolina can
advance its regulatory purpose by imposing fewer burdens on in-state
wineries than out-of-state wineries.”211 Rather, it was “whether
discriminating in favor of in-state wineries” helped to serve the state’s
regulatory purposes,212 and the existence of a more restrictive
alternative helped to demonstrate that the answer to this question
was no.213
In short, whenever an area of doctrine identifies discriminatory
treatment as a constitutional evil,214 a more restrictive alternative
might function to condemn a less restrictive law for the simple reason
that that the former, unlike the latter, does not discriminate. The more
restrictive means, in other words, identifies a desired middle path
between the Scylla of disfavored discrimination and the Charybdis of
unfulfilled regulatory needs. And the availability of such a middle
path thus highlights an equality-based flaw in the less restrictive law
under review.
It bears emphasizing that in order to highlight an equality-based
defect in a less restrictive law, a more restrictive means must
necessarily qualify as nondiscriminatory in the relevant doctrinal
sense; that is, the equality-based argument works only if the more
restrictive means itself avoids the form of problematic discrimination
that is manifested by the less restrictive law. It need not be the case,
however, that the more restrictive (and nondiscriminatory)
alternative would function to alleviate discriminatory effects. That is
due to the well-established principle—recognized both within and
outside of the equal protection context—that effects-based
discrimination poses a lesser constitutional evil than does a facially or

211. Id. at 517.
212. Id. (emphasis in original)
213. Id.
214. As the foregoing discussion should make clear, an established constitutional
presumption against discriminatory treatment is a necessary prerequisite to an equalitybased invocation of a more restrictive means. Equality-based defectiveness, that is, can
exist only in connection with an established doctrinal presumption against some form of
intentional or facial discrimination. And that in turn means that equality-based arguments
need not themselves provide any explanation as to why the particular form of equality
manifested by the more restrictive means (and flouted by the “less restrictive” law) is
constitutionally valuable; that conclusion is already amply supported by the existence of a
decision rule that presumptively condemns the form of discriminatory treatment at issue.
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intentionally discriminatory law.215 Given this distinction—i.e.,
between facial/intentional discrimination on the one hand and
unintentional/effects-based discrimination on the other—equalitybased invocations of a more restrictive alternative should not fail
simply because the more restrictive alternative would give rise to
lingering discriminatory effects. Put differently, if the Court seriously
believes (as it repeatedly says it does) that formal rather than
functional discrimination is the touchstone of unconstitutionality,
then a more restrictive alternative need only qualify as a formally
nondiscriminatory alternative in order to eliminate the
constitutionally suspect form of discriminatory treatment under
review.
The Court, to be sure, has not always recognized this point,
occasionally invoking the prospect of discriminatory effects as a
reason not to demand adherence to a more restrictive alternative.
Recall, for instance, Justice Kennedy’s assertion in Nguyen v. INS
that the more restrictive alternative of subjecting citizen-mother
children to a more onerous set of citizenship requirements would
yield only a “hollow-neutrality” across gender-based lines, with the
formally gender-neutral requirements still proving in practice more
difficult for citizen-father applicants to satisfy.216 This is an argument
215. The reluctance to apply heightened scrutiny to effectively discriminatory laws is
typically associated with equal protection cases such as Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976), and Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), in which the Court
refused to apply heightened scrutiny to facially neutral laws that exerted problematic
discriminatory effects. But the Court has embraced a similar distinction in many other
areas of doctrine. With respect to the First Amendment’s content-discrimination principle,
for instance, the Court has said that “[a] regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the
content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some
speakers or messages but not others.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S 781, 791
(1989). With respect to the dormant Commerce Clause, the Court repeatedly distinguishes
between “facially discriminatory,” measures on the one hand, and measures that
“regulate[] evenhandedly with only incidental effects on interstate commerce.” Or. Waste
Sys. v. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994). In the free exercise context,
Employment Division v. Smith virtually announced the principle on its face, given its
explicit rejection of free exercise claims predicated on the effects of neutral and generally
applicable laws. See Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV.
1, 10 (1990) (noting that Smith makes “formal neutrality the dominant principle of the
Court’s free exercise jurisprudence”). And while the Court has not yet said anything about
the equal sovereignty principle’s application to facially neutral federal laws with
discriminatory effects, the sheer number of such laws already on the books would likely
militate against any sort of effects-based approach. Cf. Colby, supra note 188, at 1149–51.
216. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 64 (2001). The idea, in short, was that even a formally
gender-neutral proof-of-parentage rule would sometimes require fathers to take
“additional affirmative steps,” because mothers, by necessarily being present at the
moment of a child’s birth, were more likely to have their name recorded on a child’s birth
certificate. Id.
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that, as Justice O’Connor noted in dissent, failed to take seriously the
premium that the Justices had elsewhere placed on the value of
formal neutrality (and instead took seriously a form of inequality
whose doctrinal significance the Court had elsewhere minimized).217
Put another way, by dismissing the more restrictive means as
guaranteeing only “hollow neutrality,” the Court in Nguyen
characterized as “hollow” the very sort of neutrality that equal
protection doctrine routinely demands. And in so doing, the Court
generated a result at odds with other features of the doctrine writ
large.218
B. The Sincerity-Based Argument
More restrictive means analysis does not arise exclusively in
connection with the claim that a law unnecessarily discriminates in
pursuit of a legitimate regulatory objective. That point should be
immediately evident from the fact that not all of the doctrines I
considered in Part II single out discriminatory treatment as a trigger
of heightened scrutiny. (The notable outlier is substantive due process
doctrine, which calls for heightened scrutiny of all laws—whether
discriminatory or not—that infringe on fundamental rights.)219 And in
fact, many of the examples I discussed in Part II have utilized more
restrictive means analysis not for the purpose of highlighting a
nondiscriminatory means of achieving a stated regulatory objective,
but instead for the purpose of questioning the government’s level of
commitment to the objective said to justify the law under review. In
this way can a more restrictive means function to demonstrate
sincerity-related defects in a constitutionally suspect law.220
217. See id. at 82 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (contending that “the majority . . .
denigrat[es] as ‘hollow’ the very neutrality that the law requires” (quoting id. at 64)).
218. Indeed, this feature of the majority opinion in Nguyen, along with others, has led
to the suggestion that the majority did not in fact apply “intermediate scrutiny,” instead
extending special deference to Congress in light of its plenary power over matters of
immigration and naturalization. See, e.g., Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in
Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 148 n.352 (2010) (“The
disagreement between the majority and the dissent in Nguyen may partly have been a
disagreement about the level of scrutiny that should apply in this case.”).
219. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1996).
220. To be sure, the Court need not (and often does not) explicitly invoke a more
restrictive means in order to sustain a sincerity-based attack on a less restrictive law.
Oftentimes, the attack proceeds simply by reference to curiously permissive or lenient
features of a law that make little sense in light of the interest it purports to achieve. But
even by pointing out these features of the law, the Court is still implicitly drawing
attention to the government’s failure to regulate more restrictively. There is not much of a
functional difference between saying: “this law doesn’t regulate A even though the interest
would seem to require it,” or instead saying: “if the government had been serious about
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The force of the sincerity-based argument derives from the
notion that when the government invokes a “compelling,”
“important,” “legitimate,” or otherwise sufficiently strong regulatory
interest on a law’s behalf, that interest really ought to be the one that
underlies the law. Even the most compelling government interest in
the world cannot suffice to sustain a law that pursues that interest in
an incomplete and halfhearted fashion. Rather, the intuition goes, a
law must pursue that interest with some level of efficacy in order to
claim the benefit of that interest’s justificatory force. Whatever its
ultimate philosophical underpinnings,221 the gist of the idea has long
been recognized and embraced by the Court. As the Court itself once
put the point, “a law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest of
the highest order . . . when it leaves appreciable damage to that
supposedly vital interest unprohibited.”222
This idea gives rise to a second mechanism by which a more
restrictive
alternative
might
function
to
highlight
the
unconstitutionality of a less restrictive law. Consider again Justice
Blackmun’s suggestion in Roe v. Wade that Texas’s failure to
criminalize abortions necessary to save the life of the mother counted

pursuing this interest, it would have adopted a more restrictive alternative that
encompassed the regulation of A.” Both claims point to the same underlying defect:
namely, a lack of a genuine commitment to the regulatory interest that the government
claims on behalf of a constitutionally suspect law.
221. We can imagine a variety of reasons why courts might care about the extent to
which a law actually does further an interest invoked on its behalf. The idea may have
something to do with concerns about subjective motives, positing that the less effectively a
law promotes a legitimate government interest, the more likely it was that the legislature
enacted the law to achieve some other illegitimate purpose. See Fallon, supra note 2, at
1327; see also Volokh, Freedom of Speech, supra note 2, at 2420 (suggesting that a law’s
“underinclusiveness . . . may be evidence that an interest is not compelling, because it
suggests that the government itself doesn’t see the interest as compelling enough to justify
a broader statute”). Relatedly, the intuition may stem from concerns about objective
appearances: Even if the enactors of a less restrictive law intended for it to serve a
legitimate interest, its patent inability at doing so might raise red flags in the eyes of
outside observers who already have reason to doubt its constitutionality. See Republican
Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 780 (2002) (“As a means of pursuing the objective
. . . that respondents now articulate, the [law] is so woefully underinclusive as to render
belief in that purpose a challenge to the credulous.”). Or perhaps the intuition states a
point about proportionality or interest balancing, maintaining that courts should tolerate
the liberty-related costs of a constitutionally suspect law only when those costs are
outweighed by real and substantial regulatory gains. See Fallon, supra note 2, at 1327
(“Even absent concern about governmental motives, the demand that restrictions on
constitutional rights not be underinclusive reflects an insistence that the government not
infringe on rights when doing so will predictably fail to achieve purportedly justifying
goals.”).
222. Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 780 (quoting Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491
U.S. 524, 541–42 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
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as a further strike against the law under review.223 How could this
seemingly lenient feature of the Texas law—one that spared women
from an especially severe invasion of bodily autonomy—have
contributed to its undoing? The answer, in short, had to do with a
sincerity-related problem. Recall that Texas had claimed on behalf of
its abortion ban a compelling—indeed, absolute—interest in
safeguarding for unborn fetuses the right to life guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.224 But the state’s
eschewal of a more restrictive alternative raised doubts in the
majority’s minds about the veracity of this claim, suggesting that the
protection of an absolute, Fourteenth Amendment “right to life” was
not a regulatory object that Texas had genuinely set out to achieve. If
the state had been truly concerned about the constitutional rights of
the unborn, the Court argued, it would have enacted a far more
restrictive anti-abortion measure.225 And Texas’s failure to enact such
a law thus signaled to the Court that it was not being sincere in
invoking this particularly rigorous and sweeping state interest on
behalf of the less restrictive law it had chosen to enact.
Unlike its equality-based counterpart, then, the sincerity-based
argument can apply even in the absence of an established
constitutional presumption against discriminatory treatment. But it is
also true that sincerity-related arguments remain available even
where a law does discriminate in a constitutionally suspect manner.
Cleburne, for instance, was an equal protection case, and the Court
there identified insufficiently restrictive features of the city’s zoning
decision as evidence of its unconstitutionality.226 But the more
restrictive means analysis in Cleburne was not intended to highlight a
nondiscriminatory path forward; rather, its function was to impugn a
particular claim of interest that the government had proffered to the
Court: for example, the Court pointed to the city’s permissive
treatment of fraternity houses and assisted living facilities as
inconsistent with various goals that Cleburne had cited in support of
its refusal to permit construction of a living center for mentally
disabled individuals.227 Had the city instead pursued the more
restrictive alternative of a categorical ban on the construction of
223. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 n.54 (1973).
224. Id. at 154.
225. Id. at 157 n.54 (“But if the fetus is a person who is not to be deprived of life
without due process of law, and if the mother’s condition is the sole determinant, does not
the Texas exception appear to be out of line with the Amendment’s command?”).
226. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985); see supra
Section II.C.
227. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.
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group homes or a hard-and-fast occupancy limit for all dwellings, then
its arguments about overcrowding, flood risks, and traffic congestion
might have found greater purchase. But the city’s failure to regulate
more restrictively led the Court to cast those justifications aside.
Nor does the supposedly nondiscriminatory nature of a more
restrictive means preclude it from also highlighting sincerity-based
defects in a less restrictive law. Consider in this respect Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Lukumi, the animal sacrifice case.
Tellingly, the bulk of the Court’s more restrictive means analysis
preceded its application of strict scrutiny; that is, the Court alluded to
more restrictive alternatives in the course of rendering its threshold
determination that Hialeah’s animal-sacrifice prohibitions were not in
fact “generally applicable” with respect to religion.228 That
determination rested largely on the challenged law’s insufficient
restrictiveness. By cross-referencing the relatively narrow scope of the
city’s regulatory approach against the sorts of laws that would have
more effectively achieved the City’s claimed interest in promoting
animal safety and public health, the Court was able to look past the
patina of facial neutrality and find within the regulatory scheme an
impermissible, religion-targeting object.229 How could, for instance,
Hialeah claim that its animal sacrifice laws furthered an interest in
“public health,” when it refused also to prohibit the “improper
disposal” of animal carcasses by hunters or restaurant managers?230
How could Hialeah claim that the ordinances furthered an interest in
“preventing cruelty to animals,” when it continued to permit fishing,
rodent extermination, euthanasia of stray or unwanted pets, and even
“the use of live rabbits to train greyhounds”?231 The Court declared in
so many words that the city both could have and would have pursued
a more restrictive alternative if it had truly been serious about
pursuing any of the religion-neutral interests it had invoked. The
plethora of more restrictive (and generally applicable) alternatives
available to serve the secular interests associated with the laws
undermined the conclusion that these particular interests in fact had
anything to do with the laws’ enactment.
Thus, in contrast to the equality-based argument, which can
apply only in connection with a constitutional norm against
discriminatory treatment, the sincerity-based argument can apply
both within and outside of doctrines that discourage facial
228.
229.
230.
231.

Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 535–36 (1993).
Id. at 537.
Id. at 538.
Id. at 537–38.
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discrimination. Similarly, whereas the equality-based argument
requires as its input a more restrictive means that also qualifies as a
nondiscriminatory means, the sincerity-based argument can work
with a more restrictive means that is either discriminatory or
nondiscriminatory in nature. Indeed, a more restrictive means can
sometimes function successfully as a “more sincere means” even
when it manifests precisely the same form of disfavored
discriminatory treatment as the less restrictive law that it helps to
condemn.232 In these respects, then, the sincerity-based argument
enjoys a broader range of operation than does its equality-based
counterpart.
IV. THE REGULATORY VIABILITY OF MORE RESTRICTIVE
ALTERNATIVES
Both the equality- and sincerity-based arguments provide
reasons for concluding that the existence of more restrictive means
cuts against the constitutionality of a less restrictive law. But more
restrictive means arguments do not always succeed, and there are a
variety of reasons why this might be so. One important set of reasons
relates to issues of “regulatory viability.” Simply put, if a posited
more restrictive alternative is unlikely to achieve the relevant
government interests as well as the less restrictive law, then that fact
provides a straightforward reason for dismissing it as an inadequate
regulatory substitute. This sort of argument frequently arises in cases
involving more restrictive means analysis, with the government
pointing to concerns about adverse regulatory consequences as
justifying, or at least excusing, its failure to regulate more
restrictively.
Questions of regulatory viability, to be sure, are by no means
unique to more restrictive means analysis; they can just as easily arise
when less restrictive alternatives are being considered as well. But
these questions take on an added layer of complexity when applied to
more restrictive alternatives—laws that, by definition, do not require
the government to “ease up” on any of the parties that it already
232. In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, for instance, some of the posited more restrictive
alternatives to the municipal sign ordinance under review might still have qualified as
content-based; even so, the Court could still leverage such alternatives on behalf of the
claim that the City was not pursuing its interests as aggressively as possible. 135 S. Ct.
2218, 2231 (2015) (noting that the City’s ordinance problematically permitted the
proliferation of “larger ideological signs”); see also id. at 2232 (“The Town has offered no
reason to believe that directional signs pose a greater threat to safety than do ideological
or political signs. If anything, a sharply worded ideological sign seems more likely to
distract a driver than a sign directing the public to a nearby church meeting.”).
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regulates and thus, on their face, do not require any immediately
obvious sacrifice in the way of the regulatory interests said to justify a
law under review. In other words, if the state defends a law’s
burdensome (or non-beneficial) treatment of a particular individual
by reference to some regulatory need, that need should presumably
remain just as well served by a law that leaves that treatment no more
burdensome (or non-beneficial) than it previously had been. At
worst, the argument goes, a more restrictive alternative will result in
the gratuitous coverage of previously uncovered parties—coverage
that the government may regard as unnecessary but ultimately
harmless to its regulatory goals. Less restrictive alternatives often
require some degree of regulatory sacrifice on the part of the state,
releasing certain parties from a form of adverse treatment the state
claims is necessary to achieve some important underlying goal. But
more restrictive alternatives steer clear of that difficulty, leaving
entirely undiluted the particular set of burdens/benefit-denials the
state had originally sought to impose.
That, at least, is the prima facie case for concluding that more
restrictive alternatives will always serve the relevant government
interests at least as well as their less restrictive counterparts. But the
argument faces difficulties, as there exist at least four separate
reasons why the government might plausibly object to a more
restrictive alternative on viability-related grounds. First, government
actors might resist enactment of a more restrictive means for the
simple reason that it gratuitously regulates unproblematic conduct.
Second, government actors might complain that a more restrictive
alternative is unduly costly to administer. Third, government actors
might argue that a more restrictive alternative affirmatively
undermines the effective operation of a law’s burden-imposing (or
benefit-withholding) elements and thus compromises the regulatory
interest that the government seeks to pursue. And finally,
government actors might argue that a more restrictive alternative
undermines additional government interests served by the lenient, or
non-burden-producing, elements of the law under review. These
arguments, as will be shown, can make sense on their own terms, but
some are more effective than others in supplying a doctrinally
sufficient justification for the government’s failure to regulate more
restrictively.
A. Nonexistent Regulatory Benefits
The first ground on which the government might resist adoption
of a more restrictive means is the most straightforward: namely, the
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government might maintain that a given regulatory problem does not
require anything beyond what a less restrictive law already provides.
The argument, in short, is one of nonexistent regulatory benefits.
Where a challenged law covers only the conduct necessary to achieve
the government’s regulatory ends, expanding the scope of its
coverage would deliver no additional benefits in connection with
those ends. The claim, in other words, is not that the increase in
restrictiveness would jeopardize the government’s ability to achieve
its interest, but rather that it would force the government to pursue
that interest in a pointlessly overinclusive manner.
Recall, for instance, Justice Blackmun’s plurality opinion in
Burson v. Freeman—the case involving Tennessee’s content-based
ban on political solicitation within one hundred feet of polling
places.233 A more restrictive alternative to the law might have
forbidden all forms of solicitation (commercial, charitable,
ideological, etc.) within one hundred feet of the polls, thus allowing
Tennessee to continue pursuing its interest in curbing election fraud
without so obviously distinguishing between and among different
types of speech. But to the Burson plurality, this approach seemed
silly, amounting to a requirement that the state “regulate for
problems that do not exist.”234 Expanding the coverage of Tennessee’s
anti-electioneering law, to be sure, would not necessarily have been
detrimental to the compelling state interests underlying the law: a
more restrictive alternative might still have deterred political
solicitation just as forcefully as the less restrictive law under review.
But the expansion, the plurality maintained, would also have been
pointless, requiring the state to monitor for and to prohibit various
forms of solicitation that posed no threat to the holding of fair and
effective elections.235 Therefore, the plurality held, Tennessee could
continue to pursue its election-protection interests in the less
restrictive but discriminatory manner that it currently embraced.236
How persuasive is this reasoning? The answer depends largely on
the distinction introduced in the previous Part—i.e., between
233. See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text.
234. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 207 (1992) (plurality opinion).
235. See id.
236. See id. at 191. The Court credited a similar sort of argument in Rostker, pointing
to several statements from the legislative record in which military officials claimed no
need for the power to conscript female soldiers. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S.
57, 76 (1981). This emphasis on needlessness, to be sure, did not amount to the whole of
the argument for upholding the gender-based registration requirements, see infra Section
IV.B (discussing claims in Rostker about administrative costs), but it did figure
prominently in the majority opinion.
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equality-based and sincerity-based invocations of a more restrictive
alternative. Simply put, an argument about nonexistent regulatory
benefits can offer a persuasive rebuttal to a sincerity-based challenge,
but it does not offer much of a response to an equality-based
challenge.
The sincerity-based argument, recall, carries force only when a
more restrictive means would more effectively achieve the interests
said to justify a less restrictive law. Consequently, if the only effect of
increasing a law’s restrictiveness would be to bring some amount of
non-problematic conduct within its regulatory ambit, then the more
restrictive means does little to cast doubt on the government’s
commitment to the problem it purports to address. Any attempt in
Burson, for example, to infer from the Tennessee electioneering ban
a lack of government seriousness about the fairness of its elections
would have been severely undercut by a finding that only political
solicitation posed a threat to electoral fairness. Much to the contrary,
the finding would have suggested that Tennessee’s decision not to
enact the more restrictive law reflected nothing more than an
accurate appraisal of the problem that it faced. And what is true of
that particular example should be true of sincerity-based arguments
more generally. From the mere fact that a more restrictive alternative
would in no way detract from a law’s efficacy, it should not follow that
the less restrictive law is insufficiently tailored to achieve the interest
it purports to serve.
In contrast, where a more restrictive alternative accompanies an
equality-based attack on a law, the “nonexistent regulatory benefits”
argument provides a much-weakened defense. As far as the equalitybased argument is concerned, it should not matter much whether an
increase in restrictiveness fails to translate into an increase in
regulatory effectiveness. All that matters is that the increase in
restrictiveness not compromise the government interests in question.
This is so because the achievement of a constitutionally salient form
of equality is a benefit in and of itself; that is the critical premise of
the decision rule that triggered heightened review in the first place.
Consequently, the needless regulation of nonproblematic conduct
may simply be a price worth paying to ensure that the government
does not discriminate on the basis of a constitutionally suspect
classification.
Burson again helps to illustrate the point. For reasons already
discussed, the availability of a more restrictive means in no way
undermined Tennessee’s claim that the challenged law really did
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promote electoral fairness.237 But it severely undercut the claim that
the electoral fairness interest required a departure from the
constitutional presumption in favor of content-neutral speech
restrictions.238 A categorical ban on all solicitation at the polls would
still have allowed the state to achieve its electoral fairness interest and
to do so in a content-neutral way. True, the more restrictive law might
not have delivered any additional regulatory benefits in the way of
regulatory efficacy,239 but it would have delivered the significant
constitutional benefit of avoiding content-discrimination in the first
place. If Tennessee’s only objection to the more restrictive alternative
was that it prohibited non-problematic conduct, then that objection,
in and of itself, should not have sufficed to save the less restrictive law
from equality-based constitutional attack. Something more should
have to be offered by the government to justify the contentdiscriminatory lines it had drawn.
All of that being said, it bears emphasizing that complaints about
the absence of regulatory benefits do not normally appear in
isolation. Rather, such complaints typically accompany other claims
related to the costs of increasing a law’s restrictiveness. From the
government’s perspective, that is, an unimproved status quo is by no
means the worst-case result of a restrictiveness-increasing change in
the law; more problematically, an increase in a law’s restrictiveness
can impose negative costs on both the government and the parties
that it regulates. And, as the next Sections will show, these negative
costs can sometimes provide valid reasons for excusing the
government’s failure to adopt a more restrictive alternative.
B. Administrative Costs
Consider first the prospect of administrative costs. Increasing the
restrictiveness of legal prohibition often means increasing the costs of
its implementation.240 Criminalizing a wider range of conduct might
237. Burson, 504 U.S. at 207.
238. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“Content-based
regulations are presumptively invalid.”).
239. I should note that it is by no means inconceivable that a categorical solicitation
ban would have prevented political solicitation more effectively than the less restrictive
ban that Tennessee had employed. Perhaps, for instance, a categorical ban would have
worked better by removing the need to conduct particularized inquiries into the nature of
arguably “political” forms of solicitation, and by creating a sort of prophylactic deterrent
against subtler efforts to influence or intimidate voters by means of ostensibly “nonpolitical” advocacy.
240. Though not always. In the context of benefit-conferring laws, the more restrictive
means will often prove far less costly to administer, thus defeating any governmental
attempt to wave away the more restrictive means on cost-related grounds. Consider, for
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require the investigation of more activities, the bringing of more
prosecutions, and the adjudication of more cases. Ratcheting up
procedural and evidentiary requirements might slow down the
government’s processing of administrative claims. Raising everyone’s
taxes might demand increased monitoring for tax evasion. And
whenever administrative costs materialize, opportunity costs
inevitably follow: all else equal, the more resources the government
must devote to the administration of a more restrictive means, the
fewer resources it can devote to the regulatory mission on which it
has fixed its aim.
The prospect of administrative costs, especially when coupled
with the prospect of nonexistent regulatory benefits, might therefore
render a more restrictive means especially undesirable to government
actors. And the Court has occasionally cited to such concerns as
providing a legally sufficient basis for excusing a failure to regulate
more restrictively. Rostker v. Goldberg241 is a telling case in point. All
parties there agreed that the Selective Service system helped to
further the government’s important interest in “raising and
supporting armies.”242 What the parties did not agree on, however,
was whether that same compelling interest necessitated the
discriminatory nature of these requirements, or whether the interest
could be equally well served (if not better served) by a more
restrictive—and gender-neutral—set of registration requirements.
The government said no, citing a variety of administrative difficulties
likely to arise from its implementation of a gender-neutral military
draft. The Court agreed, excusing the government’s failure to adopt
the more restrictive alternative in light of concerns about the added
administrative costs that would result from training conscripted
female soldiers alongside male soldiers and from developing housing
policies and “physical standards” for co-educational regiments.243 In
short, the Court concluded that the various administrative costs of
instance, Justice Scalia’s suggestion in Locke v. Davey that Washington could have
alternatively achieved its interests by simply abolishing a program that provided
scholarship money to eligible recipients. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
Certainly, the more restrictive alternative of a non-existent scholarship program would
have been cheaper than the less restrictive scholarship program that the state actually
administered.
241. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
242. Id. at 70.
243. See supra notes 123–31 and accompanying text. Dissenting in Rostker, Justice
Marshall objected to the majority’s reliance on these and other administrative costs. See
Rostker, 453 U.S. at 95 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“This Court has repeatedly stated that
the administrative convenience of employing a gender classification is not an adequate
constitutional justification under the Craig v. Boren test.”).
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introducing females into Selective Service were significant enough to
justify the government’s continued adherence to a less restrictive,
male-only registration system.244
One can sympathize with the proposition that the operative
principles of constitutional doctrine should not force the government
to devote time, money, and effort toward the regulation of conduct it
deems unworthy of regulation. But should complaints about
administrative costs generally suffice to demonstrate the non-viability
of a more restrictive alternative?
In my view, they should not. It is, after all, a well-accepted
feature of any well-functioning constitutional system that rights and
structural protections will sometimes require government actors to
work harder at solving a problem than they otherwise would need to
do: the added degree of work is simply the cost of doing business in a
system subject to constitutional constraints. An absolute ban on gun
ownership might provide a more efficient means of gun control than
any number of different registration, background check, and
permitting requirements currently in place, but few would cite to that
fact alone as a reason for upholding such a ban against a Second
Amendment attack. Uncompensated takings of property might
simplify the administration of public building projects, but few would
cite that fact as a valid reason for ignoring the requirements of the
Takings Clause. Imprisoning citizens without trial might permit the
courts to function more efficiently, but the Due Process Clause would
not permit reliance on such an administrative shortcut. And the same
principle should hold in connection with the various constitutional
norms that have been considered here: the comparative costliness of a
more restrictive alternative should not in and of itself render it an
inadequate substitute for a constitutionally suspect law.245
244. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 83. So, too, did the Court in Nguyen allude to similar
concerns, approvingly characterizing the “less demanding” set of citizenship application
requirements that Congress had enacted as an “easily administered scheme” that steered
clear of the “subjectivity, intrusiveness, and difficulties of proof” to which a more
restrictive (but gender-neutral) set of requirements might have given rise. Nguyen v. INS,
533 U.S. 53, 69 (2001); see also id. at 88 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“There is no reason to
think that this is a case where administrative convenience concerns are so powerful that
they would justify the sex-based discrimination . . . .”).
245. See generally Alan Brownstein, Taking Free Exercise Rights Seriously, 57 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 55, 117 (2006) (“[G]enerally speaking, we protect many rights even though
doing so imposes various burdens on individuals, the public at large, or the government.
These burdens include administrative inconvenience or inefficiency costs, maintenance
and wear and tear costs, out of pocket financial expenses and loss of revenue, and
attenuated social instability and unlawful conduct costs.”); see also Tussman & tenBroek,
supra note 11, at 351 (noting that “the Court, while giving weight to pleas of
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Of no small importance, the Court itself has endorsed this very
idea, repeatedly asserting that claims of “administrative
inconvenience” are inadequate to justify the enactment of otherwise
unconstitutional laws.246 In the sex-discrimination context, for
instance, the Court has “rejected administrative ease and convenience
as sufficiently important objectives to justify gender-based
classifications.”247 Nor may racially discriminatory laws be justified by
arguments based on “simple administrative convenience” and “the
interest in avoiding . . . bureaucratic effort.”248 Similarly, in the free
speech context, the Court has rejected claims of “small administrative
convenience” as insufficient to justify the enactment of content-based
laws,249 and it has proclaimed more generally that “the First
Amendment does not permit the State to sacrifice speech for
efficiency.”250 So too for fundamental rights based claims involving
equal protection and substantive due process: “the prospect of
additional administrative inconvenience has not been thought to
justify invasion of fundamental constitutional rights.”251 To be sure,
administrative convenience arguments can and should prevail when
subject to deferential forms of constitutional scrutiny.252 But where
stricter forms of means/ends analysis apply, the Court has been and
should be reluctant to uphold a law on convenience-related grounds
alone.
The discussion thus far has examined the problem of
administrative costs as it applies to equality-based based invocations
of a more restrictive alternative. But the same conclusions should
generally hold true when sincerity-based arguments enter the picture.
To see the point, consider once again Justice Harlan’s observation in
Poe v. Ullman that Connecticut’s failure to enforce its antiadministrative difficulties, must stand guard against an overconcern for mere
‘convenience’”).
246. See Brownstein, supra note 245, at 117–28.
247. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976); see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (plurality opinion) (“[W]hen we enter the realm of ‘strict judicial
scrutiny,’ there can be no doubt that ‘administrative convenience’ is not a shibboleth, the
mere recitation of which dictates constitutionality.”).
248. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 508 (1989); see also Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (“[T]hat the implementation of a program capable of
providing individualized consideration [of college applications] might present
administrative challenges does not render constitutional an otherwise problematic
system.”).
249. Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 102 n.9 (1972).
250. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988).
251. Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 691 (1977).
252. See, e.g., Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 566 U.S. 673, 682 (2012) (quoting
Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 511–12 (1937)).
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contraception statutes “conduce[d] to the inference either that it does
not consider the policy of the statute a very important one, or that it
does not regard the means it has chosen for its effectuation as
appropriate or necessary.”253 And now suppose that Connecticut had
responded to this argument with a variant on the “administrative
costs” defense, attributing its non-enforcement of the law to its
concerns that the requisite investigations, prosecutions, and
adjudications would drain its treasury of the resources needed to deal
with other, more important laws on the books. Even if these concerns
had been 100% real, they would only have served to confirm Justice
Harlan’s original suspicions. Connecticut, simply put, did not consider
the goals of its anti-contraceptive statute to be important enough to
warrant a substantial investment of time, money, and regulatory
effort—concluding instead that the resources were better spent on
other regulatory goals. Put somewhat differently, if a state is going to
claim a “compelling” or “important” interest on behalf of a particular
law, it should at the least be required to put its money where its
mouth is. And if the state instead attributes an incomplete pursuit of
that interest to concerns about administrative costs, the very
relevance of the “administrative cost” concern should count as a
reason for rather than against faulting the government for its lack of
regulatory sincerity.
C. Diminished Regulatory Efficacy
Government actors might also resist a more restrictive
alternative on the ground that it actively undermines the regulatory
interests that prompted the enactment of the less restrictive law. The
claim, to be clear, is not simply that the more restrictive means would
fail to deliver additional regulatory benefits. Nor is it simply that the
more restrictive means would require an additional investment of
government resources. Rather, the claim involves the bolder
proposition that increased restrictiveness would actually undermine
the effectiveness of the challenged regulatory scheme. Put another
way, the “difficult regulation” argument holds that expanding the
scope and/or increasing the stringency of a law’s prohibitions will
carry the counterintuitive result of reducing its efficacy as a
regulatory tool.254
253. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 554 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
254. Notice that a diminished regulatory efficacy argument, if successful, would
provide grounds for rejecting both equality- and sincerity-based applications of more
restrictive means analysis. If the government can successfully show that an increase in
restrictiveness would actively undermine its achievement of an important government
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At first glance, the diminished regulatory efficacy argument may
seem to rest on a faulty set of premises. How can it be, one might
reasonably ask, that increasing the restrictiveness of a law will
somehow render it less effective at achieving its underlying aims?
From the government’s perspective, the more restrictive alternative
should carry the signal virtue of not requiring regulators to relax the
burdens imposed on any parties whose adverse treatment is required
by a government interest. If, in other words, the state defends a law’s
burdensome (or non-beneficial) treatment of a particular individual
by reference to some regulatory need, that need should presumably
remain just as well served by a law that treats that particular
individual exactly the same as before. At worst, the argument goes, a
more restrictive alternative will result in the gratuitous coverage of
previously uncovered parties—coverage that the government may
regard as unnecessary but ultimately harmless to its regulatory goals.
In the real world, however, regulation is a complicated enterprise
with lots of moving parts. Contrary to the implications of a simplified
academic model, more regulation does not necessarily mean more in
the way of desired regulatory effects. Sometimes, the opposite result
might obtain, with new (and perhaps unforeseen) regulatory
interactions throwing sand in the gears of the administrative
machinery. Increasing restrictiveness could therefore result in a
regulatory program that turns out to be less effective at achieving its
aims—not only as applied to the new activities the law has been
expanded to cover but also as applied the old activities that the law
had originally targeted.
Consider in this respect Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion in
Michael M. v. Superior Court. Challengers to California’s genderbased statutory rape law had raised the possibility of expanding its
prohibitions to cover both underage males and underage females.
That modification, at first glance, would have seemed to render the
law a more effective means of achieving California’s stated interest in
preventing teenage pregnancies. As Justice Brennan argued in
dissent, the more restrictive alternative would have covered “twice as
interest, then the more restrictive means will not in fact constitute a viable regulatory
alternative to the law under review. And if the more restrictive means is not a viable
regulatory alternative, then it cannot support either of the inferences on which the
equality- and sincerity-based arguments respectively depend. Even if the more restrictive
means is nondiscriminatory, it will, on account of its diminished regulatory efficacy, fail to
demonstrate the possibility of achieving the government’s interest in a nondiscriminatory
fashion. And where a more restrictive means is in fact a less effective regulatory measure,
the government’s decision to forgo the measure would seem to affirm, rather than impugn,
its commitment to the regulatory interests in question.
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many potential violators,” thus functioning as a “potentially . . .
greater deterrent of sexual activity than a gender-based law.”255 Justice
Rehnquist, however, reached precisely the opposite conclusion, citing
to the state’s concerns that the more restrictive alternative would
“frustrate its interest in effective enforcement” by deterring females
from coming forward to report violations of the law.256 The total
number of successful prosecutions, Rehnquist appeared to claim,
would therefore go down rather than up, with female participants in
underage sex unwilling to inform prosecutors about conduct for which
they themselves could be prosecuted. Consequently, even if the law
on the books might appear to deter more effectively, the law on the
ground would actually deter less effectively. Or so the plurality
argued.257
I am not aware of other cases in which the Justices have explicitly
embraced arguments of this sort, but variations on the theme are
readily imaginable. It might have been argued in Lukumi, perhaps,
that a broadened animal cruelty ordinance—one that included not
just animal sacrifice rituals but also fishing, hunting, and euthanasia—
would stretch prosecutorial resources so thin as to undermine the
city’s ability to go after the most heinous and harmful forms of the
conduct being regulated.258 Or perhaps it could have been argued in
Burson that prohibiting all forms of solicitation at polling places
would have made it more difficult for election monitors to deal with
the targeted problem of undue interference with voters.259 Especially
when one considers that law enforcement resources are finite, it may
well be the case that increasing the restrictiveness of law will result in
weaker enforcement across the board.
Still, while a more restrictive alternative might sometimes
introduce new regulatory complications into the mix, the diminished
regulatory efficacy argument faces two serious difficulties. The first
difficulty is the previously mentioned “administrative inconvenience”
rule. If, as the Court has said, constitutionally suspect laws should not
in fact be sustained on grounds of administrative ease, then
government actors should not be able to escape the implications of a
more restrictive means argument by simply claiming that the more
restrictive law would be more difficult to enforce. Complaints about
diminished regulatory efficacy, in other words, may turn out to be
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 494 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 473–74 (plurality opinion).
See id.
See supra notes 74–80 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text.
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nothing more than complaints about administrative costs in disguise.
Indeed, even California’s enforcement-related concerns in Michael M.
might have been analyzed along these lines. The claim in Michael M.
was not so much one about the impossibility of convicting guilty
parties under a gender-neutral statutory rape law, but rather about
the added administrative burdens of bringing successful prosecutions
in the absence of fewer voluntary reporters.260
At the very least, then, the Court in Michael M. should have
offered some explanation for its decision to validate California’s
enforcement-related concerns. Perhaps, for instance, the Court
regarded the concerns as stating something other than a complaint
about administrative inconvenience? Perhaps the Court regarded
Michael M. as a sex discrimination case in which the administrative
inconvenience bar should not have applied? The Court, however,
failed to grapple with these questions.
The broader question raised by the Michael M. case is whether
diminished regulatory efficacy arguments should always be dismissed
on the ground that they implicate concerns about administrative
costs. At some point, the regulatory burdens of enforcing a more
restrictive alternative may become so prohibitively high as to pose a
bona fide obstacle to regulatory success—an obstacle that,
realistically speaking, government actors cannot overcome by simply
doubling down on their regulatory efforts. In that sense, the
difference between arguments grounded in diminished regulatory
efficacy and arguments grounded in administrative costs may be one
of degree rather than kind. The more severe the regulatory burdens,
the less plausible it becomes to characterize the complaint as one of
administrative inconvenience, and the more plausible it becomes to
say that a more restrictive alternative would actually thwart the
government’s regulatory objectives. The relevant challenge for the
court, then, is figuring out where on the severity spectrum this
distinction should lie. Thus, when the government resists a more
restrictive alternative on grounds of diminished regulatory efficacy,
courts should validate the argument only when the government has
adequately demonstrated the infeasibility or impracticability of
compensating for the diminished efficacy through added regulatory
work. Precisely what counts as “infeasible” or “impracticable” will
not always be an easy question to answer, but it is a question that
courts have no choice but to confront.

260. 450 U.S. at 473–74.

96 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2017)

2017]

MORE RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVES

63

But even where a diminished regulatory efficacy argument states
more than a complaint about administrative costs, a further difficulty
remains: more restrictive alternatives will often yield effectivenessrelated gains at the same time that they deliver effectiveness-related
losses. And when a more restrictive alternative simultaneously
detracts from and contributes to the government’s regulatory goals,
courts should not view the detractions in isolation from the
contributions. This point was critical to the dissenters’ disagreement
with the plurality in Michael M.: even if, as Justice Brennan
explained, a gender-neutral statutory rape law would have
undermined the government’s pregnancy-prevention goals by
discouraging voluntary reporting of prohibited sexual encounters, a
more restrictive law would have simultaneously furthered the
government’s interests by doubling the scope of the law’s coverage.261
The plurality, in other words, had simply identified one respect in
which a gender-neutral statutory rape law might have failed to deter
as effectively as its male-only counterpart. But given the possibility
that a more restrictive alternative might also have generated
countervailing, deterrence-promoting forces, the plurality’s
conclusion of diminished regulatory effectiveness in no way followed
from its premise of “reduced voluntary reporting.” This argument, as
the dissenters persuasively demonstrated, had a missing link. The
plurality needed to show that the deterrence-reducing mechanisms of
the more restrictive means (i.e., the reduced likelihood that females
would “turn in” violators of law) would outperform their deterrencepromoting counterparts (e.g., the increased likelihood that both males
and females would abstain from engaging in underage sexual
encounters for fear of violating the law).262 The absence of such a
showing in Michael M. thus significantly undercut the plurality’s
arguments about diminished regulatory efficacy.
To summarize, increasing a law’s restrictiveness can sometimes
carry the counterintuitive consequence of diluting its efficacy. But the
prospect of diminished regulatory efficacy should not make a legal
difference unless two further propositions turn out to be true. First,
the government must be genuinely unable to overcome the newlycreated regulatory obstacles of the more restrictive means. Otherwise,
a diminished regulatory efficacy claim collapses into an administrative
costs claim and finds itself subject to the administrative inconvenience
bar. Second, the government must demonstrate that the effectiveness-

261. See id. at 494 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
262. See id. at 493.
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related losses it has identified are not offset elsewhere by the
effectiveness-related gains to be had from the increase in a law’s
restrictiveness. Only when both of these showings have been made
should a court reject a more restrictive alternative on regulatoryeffectiveness grounds.
D. Government Interests in Lenience
Thus far, this Part has considered issues of regulatory viability in
connection with the government interests advanced by a law’s adverse
treatment of regulated parties. This is in keeping with the Court’s
general approach to more restrictive means analysis. In Burson, for
instance, the Court identified a government interest in suppressing
political solicitation (i.e., an interest in protecting voters against fraud
and intimidation), and it then asked whether that interest would be
equally well served by a law that prohibited all solicitation.263
Similarly, in Rostker, the Court identified a government interest in
registering men for the selective service (i.e., an interest in raising and
supporting an army), and it then asked whether the interest would be
equally well served by a law requiring both men and women to
register for the draft.264 In neither case, however, did the Court
explicitly consider the possibility that the laws’ non-adverse treatment
of non-regulated parties reflected additional government interests of
their own. The Court did not ask in Burson, for instance, whether the
government had an important interest in permitting non-political
solicitation at the polls, nor did it ask in Rostker whether the
government had an important interest in exempting females from the
draft. In both instances, rather, the Court identified the relevant
government interest by reference to the burden-imposing aspects of
the laws under review, and it then evaluated the more restrictive
means by reference to that interest and that interest alone.
Many laws, however, may simultaneously pursue multiple
government interests, including interests that relate to their nonadverse treatment of unregulated (or favorably regulated) conduct. A
criminal statute may simultaneously further a government interest in
criminalizing a bad activity and a separate government interest in not
criminalizing a good activity. The eligibility criteria of a benefits
program may simultaneously further a government interest in
withholding benefits from unworthy recipients and a separate
government interest in furnishing benefits to worthy recipients.
263. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 207–08 (1992).
264. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981).
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Simply put, laws that create both winners and losers need not further
only those objectives associated with the losses of the losers; they may
also further additional objectives associated with the wins of the
winners.
And where there exist such government interests in lenience,
there may also exist good reason to question the regulatory viability
of a more restrictive means. The more restrictive means will often
serve the interests associated with a law’s burden-imposing (or
benefit-withholding) elements, because the more restrictive means
leaves those forms of adverse treatment fully intact. But the same
cannot be said of the interests associated with a law’s burdenwithholding (or benefit-conferring) elements, some of which will not
survive an increase in overall restrictiveness. Insofar as the adoption
of a more restrictive means would compromise a law’s overall
leniency, it might also threaten to undermine the government
interests associated with that leniency.
Recall, for instance, Justice Scalia’s suggestion in Locke v. Davey
that, instead of withholding scholarships from theological students,
Washington could have just as well achieved its “anti-establishment”
interest by abolishing the scholarship program altogether.265 That
argument makes perfect sense if one stipulates that the only
government interest implicated by the scholarship program was the
interest advanced by the law’s adverse treatment of theological
students. That particular interest, everyone agreed, involved the
avoidance of an Establishment Clause violation, and that particular
interest would have remained perfectly well served by a law that
rendered everyone ineligible for public scholarships, period. But the
argument becomes far less persuasive when one recognizes that the
scholarship program’s inclusion of non-theology students served a
significant government interest of its own—namely, a governmental
interest in educating its citizens. That interest, unlike the antiestablishment interest, would have suffered under the more restrictive
alternative proposed by Justice Scalia, with the state no longer able to
subsidize what it regarded as worthy educational pursuits. In Davey,
at least, it was likely the state’s educational interests (and not its antiestablishment interests) that illustrated the non-viability of the more
restrictive means that Scalia had proposed.
The Court more explicitly embraced “lenience-related” interests
when it recently upheld Florida’s partial ban on judicial campaigning
in Williams-Yulee—a ban said to further the state’s interest in
265. See 540 U.S. 712, 729 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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promoting judicial integrity.266 Viewed exclusively from the
perspective of this judicial integrity interest, the Florida ban did
indeed appear to be “fatally underinclusive.”267 Among other things,
the law still permitted judicial candidates to create campaign
committees to solicit money on their behalf, and it also allowed such
candidates to write “thank-you notes” to donors after their
contributions had been received.268 Surely, the dissenters argued, a
more restrictive alternative that encompassed these and other
activities would only have helped to achieve the state’s “judicial
integrity” interests even more effectively, and surely, they continued,
the state should be faulted for its failure to close the current law’s
loopholes.269 But the majority cast these alternatives in a different
light. The judicial campaigning law, Chief Justice Roberts pointed
out, implicated not just Florida’s interest in preserving judicial
integrity but also Florida’s separate interest in “respect[ing] the First
Amendment interests of candidates” and “resolv[ing] the
‘fundamental tension between the ideal character of the judicial office
and the real world electoral politics.’”270 With these additional
government interests on the table, the regulatory viability of the more
restrictive means was no longer so obvious. Yes, the more restrictive
means would have served the judicial integrity interest as effectively
as (or even more effectively than) the less restrictive law, but it
simultaneously would have disserved the speech accommodation and
electoral flexibility interests that the law’s limitations helped to
advance.271
Government interests in lenience will therefore sometimes
provide a strong doctrinal basis for discounting the viability of a more
restrictive alternative. But the argument can be taken too far.
Government actors, after all, will always be able to identify some
interest underlying a decision to “go easy” on a favorably-treated set
of parties—at the very least, every government choice to limit the
breadth of a burden-imposing regulation in some manner promotes
the liberty or property interests of the unregulated group—and not

266. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1673 (2015) (citing Burson v.
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 207 (1992)).
267. See id. at 1670
268. See id. at 1677 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
269. See, e.g., id. at 1680–81.
270. Id. at 1669 (majority opinion) (quoting Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 400
(1991)).
271. See also id. at 1670 (“We will not punish Florida for leaving open more, rather
than fewer, avenues of expression.”).
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every such interest should automatically excuse the government for
its failure to regulate more restrictively.
The Third Circuit’s decision regarding PASPA, the federal
sports-gambling law, is susceptible to criticism on this ground.
Dismissing an equal sovereignty challenge to the law’s special
treatment of Nevada and a few other states, the court rejected the
challengers’ suggestion that the more restrictive alternative of a truly
nationwide sports-gambling ban would have just as effectively
achieved Congress’s interest in discouraging gambling on sports.272
That argument, the court held, misapprehended the “true purpose” of
the statute, which was to “stop the spread of state-sanctioned sports
gambling” beyond the jurisdictions that were exempted from its
requirement.273 The Third Circuit, in other words, deflected the
challengers’ “more restrictive means” argument by invoking a
“lenience interest” latent in the federal sports-gambling act. PASPA
may have sought to deter sports gambling via its adverse treatment of
non-exempt states, but it also sought to preserve sports gambling via
its non-adverse treatment of exempted states, and a categorical
sports-gambling ban would have frustrated this latter interest.
What was missing from the Third Circuit’s analysis, however, was
any explanation as to why this latter “gambling preservation” interest
should have qualified as important or significant enough to validate
the claim.274 PAPSA, the Third Circuit seemed to be saying, should be
upheld because it was “precisely tailored” to serve the government’s
interest in doing what PAPSA did. That was undoubtedly true. But
the question remained: was the government’s interest in doing what
PAPSA did important enough to justify a departure from the equal
sovereignty principle?275
272. Indeed, as Thomas Colby has pointed out, if Congress’s true goal with PASPA to
discourage sports gambling, the statute’s coverage scheme got things precisely backwards,
by permitting sports gambling in areas where the practice thrived the most. See Colby,
supra note 188, at 1156–57.
273. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 239 (3d Cir.
2013).
274. Defenders of the law had argued, for instance, that the “grandfathering” interests
helped to safeguard the reliance interests of states that already depended on revenue
streams from sports gambling and thus stood to lose much more than their fellow states
from an across-the-board prohibition on the practice. See, e.g., Response Brief of
Plaintiffs-Appellees at 16–17, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., Nos. 131713, 13-1714, 13-1715 (3d Cir. June 7, 2013) (discussing Congress’s recognition of some
states’ “reliance interests” on sports gambling revenues).
275. One can understand along similar lines the then-Justice Rehnquist’s argument in
Michael M. that California’s less restrictive statutory rape measure helped to “equalize the
deterrents on the sexes” in a way that a more restrictive, gender-neutral measure would
not. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 473 (1981) (plurality opinion). Recast as
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In sum, government interests in lenience may sometimes provide
good reason to characterize a more restrictive alternative as an
inadequate regulatory substitute for a less restrictive law. The logic of
the argument is simple and sound: sometimes the government pursues
goals related to the non-adverse treatment of various legal entities,
and a more restrictive means would frustrate those goals insofar as it
would require the government to treat those entities less favorably.
But the argument should succeed only where the lenience-related
interests are themselves shown to be sufficiently strong, satisfying
whatever criterion of significance (i.e., “legitimate,” “important,”
“compelling”) the applicable level of scrutiny sets forth. Absent such
a requirement, lenience-related interests would provide a too-easy
excuse for the government’s failure to adopt a more restrictive means,
permitting the government to justify a constitutionally suspect law by
reference to little more than its own desire to adopt the
constitutionally suspect law. There is a reason why means/ends
analysis probes not just the degree of means/ends fit but also the
importance of the ends themselves. And that should remain the case
when lenience-related interests enter the picture.
This Part has explored a variety of different avenues by which
the government might contest the proposition that a more restrictive
means constitutes an adequate regulatory substitute to a less
restrictive law. Some are more promising than others. Arguments
about nonexistent regulatory benefits can offer a persuasive response
to sincerity-based, but not equality-based, invocations of a more
restrictive means. Arguments about administrative costs should rarely
succeed, at least insofar as the Court continues to insist that
heightened means/ends scrutiny does not permit justifications based
on convenience and administrative ease. Arguments about
diminished regulatory efficacy carry more promise, but only insofar as
(a) they assert something more than a complaint about administrative
costs, and (b) they account for compensating regulatory benefits that

an argument about lenience-related interests, the claim goes as follows: California’s
statutory rape law actually pursued two government interests simultaneously: (1) the
interest in deterring teenage pregnancies, which was furthered by the imposition of
penalties on underage male,; and (2) a “lenience-related” interest in accommodating the
“physical” sanction of an unwanted pregnancies, which was furthered by the withholding
of penalties from underage females. Id. The more restrictive alternative of a genderneutral prohibition might not have undermined the first interest, but—the plurality
seemed to suggest—it would certainly have undermined this second interest, by “overpenalizing” the female-participant in sexual conduct. Id. On that basis, Rehnquist’s
opinion concluded that the more restrictive alternative turned out to be an inadequate
regulatory substitute for the less restrictive law that California had enacted. Id. at 473–74.
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might also result from the adoption of a more restrictive alternative.
Finally, arguments about lenience-related interests should often
succeed, provided that the lenience-related interests qualify as
sufficiently important regulatory objectives.
But even where all of these regulatory viability arguments fail,
there remains one last arrow in the government’s quiver. When
challengers wield a more restrictive means for purposes of attacking
on a less restrictive law, the government might redirect the
constitutional attack towards the more restrictive means itself. In
other words, governments might sometimes defend a less restrictive
law by suggesting that the more restrictive alternative would itself be
unconstitutional. The next Part considers the promises and pitfalls of
such an approach.
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL VIABILITY OF MORE RESTRICTIVE
ALTERNATIVES
A final potential justification for the government’s failure to
regulate more restrictively circles back to the Constitution itself.
Simply put, the government might claim that a more restrictive
alternative, even if an adequate regulatory substitute, would find itself
subject to constitutional invalidation. Surely, the argument goes, the
Court should not fault the government for a failure to adopt a more
restrictive means that would itself turn out to violate the Constitution
as well.
This argument is intuitively forceful, but it should not always be
decisive. Its persuasiveness, rather, depends once again on the
distinction between equality-based and sincerity-based invocations of
a more restrictive means. Let us consider each argument in turn.
A. The Equality-Based Argument
The equality-based argument invokes more restrictive
alternatives for the purpose of suggesting that a regulatory interest
does not require the government to discriminate in a constitutionally
suspect manner. That is, the availability of the more restrictive
alternative serves to undercut the government’s argument that it must
unavoidably discriminate in order to meet a pressing regulatory need.
In order for this type of claim to succeed, the more restrictive
means must itself pass constitutional muster. Otherwise, the argument
will collapse. “We would like to pursue this interest in a nondiscriminatory fashion,” the government would respond, “but given
the obvious unconstitutionality of the more restrictive option, we
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have concluded that this discriminatory law was the least
constitutionally objectionable option at our disposal.” Where the
relevant interests are sufficiently strong, and where the posited more
restrictive alternatives would themselves violate the Constitution, the
government thus retains a strong justification for its decision to
discriminate. The government can argue, in effect, that the
discriminatory law represents the “least constitutionally bad” of the
regulatory options at its disposal.
The more interesting puzzle here lies in asking how a more
discriminatory, but less restrictive law could ever pose fewer
constitutional problems than a nondiscriminatory, but more
restrictive counterpart. If, after all, an area of doctrine has tagged
nondiscriminatory
laws
as
constitutionally
preferable
to
discriminatory laws, why should the court ever regard a
discriminatory
law
as
constitutionally
preferable
to
a
nondiscriminatory alternative? A moment’s thought provides the
answer: In many cases, the increased restrictiveness of the more
restrictive (but nondiscriminatory) law will itself give rise to new
constitutional defects that the less restrictive (but discriminatory) law
manages to avoid. That a given area of doctrine generally favors
discriminatory over nondiscriminatory laws does not make every
discriminatory
law
constitutionally
preferable
to
every
nondiscriminatory law. And that is especially so where the former
proves to be more restrictive than the latter.
To see the point, consider again Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project. There the Court upheld a federal criminal prohibition on
providing material support to foreign terrorist organizations, even
while acknowledging the content-discriminatory nature of the
prohibition before it.276 I earlier noted that the Court failed even to
consider whether there existed any more restrictive (but
nondiscriminatory) alternatives to the federal material support
statute. Nowhere, in particular, did Chief Justice Roberts ask whether
the government might alternatively have pursued its terrorismprevention interests via a content-neutral (i.e., nondiscriminatory)
prohibition on any and all communications with a designated terrorist
organization.277 Such an alternative, after all, would have militated
strongly against the conclusion that content discrimination was in fact
necessary to achieve a compelling government interest. The materialsupport statute was content-based, the more restrictive means would
276. See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 69–70.
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have been content-neutral, and the latter would have presumably
been no worse than the former at deterring terrorism-aiding conduct.
How, then, could the Court justify its decision to permit the
government to combat terrorism in a content-based manner when
there existed an obviously content-neutral means of doing the same?
We cannot know for sure why the Court in Humanitarian Law
Project declined to go down this road, because the Court did not
address the issue. But I suspect that the majority would have
answered the question as follows: the more restrictive alternative,
even if content-neutral, would have been irredeemably
unconstitutional. And the fallacy in concluding otherwise lies in the
failure to notice that content-neutral statutes are not themselves
automatically valid under the First Amendment. In fact, contentneutral statutes must still withstand intermediate scrutiny, one
component of which requires that the “incidental restriction on . . .
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of [the government] interest.”278 The more restrictive
alternative would have fared especially poorly on that score, bringing
within its reach a wide range of communications with especially
dubious connections to the government’s terrorism-prevention
interests. Put somewhat differently, the more restrictive alternative
might have eliminated (or mitigated) the constitutional defect of
content discrimination, but only at the expense of introducing (or
exacerbating) the constitutional defect of a dramatically overinclusive
coverage scheme. Given that fact, the government should not have
been faulted for failing to enact a law that would have generated
serious First Amendment problems of its own.279
The more general point is this: from the different levels of
scrutiny accorded to discriminatory and nondiscriminatory laws, it
does not automatically follow that nondiscriminatory laws are always
less unconstitutional than their discriminatory counterparts.
Differential levels of scrutiny reveal that discriminatory treatment is a
variable that weighs against a finding of constitutional validity, but
they do not reveal that the presence of discriminatory treatment
qualifies as the exclusive such variable. It is not enough to say that a
278. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968).
279. To be clear, the point is not that the Court decided Holder correctly: Even putting
to one side the issue of more restrictive alternatives, there exist other grounds for
criticizing the decision. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 2, at 3139 (noting that the Court in
Holder “arguably applied a less stringent means-ends test” in upholding the material
support law, as evidenced, for instance, by the Court’s failure to “explain how the
‘contribution’ of training in international law could be ‘fungible’ with support for terrorist
activities, in the way other forms of contribution (such as money) could be”).
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more restrictive alternative would pass constitutional muster simply
because it is nondiscriminatory. That the more restrictive alternative
is nondiscriminatory explains only that it would trigger a less
demanding form of scrutiny were it ever to face a constitutional
challenge. One must therefore go on to ask how the more restrictive
alternative would fare under that level of scrutiny before concluding
that the more restrictive alternative would also be a constitutionally
valid one. And precisely because such an alternative would yield an
increase in the law’s restrictiveness, there will often be good reason to
conclude that this is not the case.280
B. The Sincerity-Based Argument
In contrast to equality-based arguments, sincerity-based
arguments can sometimes derive support from more restrictive
alternatives of dubious constitutional validity. This point should be
evident from some of the cases already considered. For example, the
thrust of the Court’s analysis in Roe left strong signals that the Court
would have struck down (and still would strike down) a law that
prohibited abortions deemed necessary to safeguard the life of the
mother281 Nevertheless, the Court still pointed to Texas’s refusal to
adopt such a law as a reason to invalidate the relatively less restrictive
abortion ban under review. Not all of the Court’s cases, to be sure,
have alluded to more restrictive alternatives with so little a chance of
being upheld, but these and other examples at least raise the question
of how a constitutionally invalid more restrictive means might
nonetheless manage to carry persuasive force. How could the
government’s refusal to enact a possibly (or even obviously)
unconstitutional law end up jeopardizing the fate of the less
restrictive law that it did in fact choose to enact?

280. Arguments related to the unconstitutionality of more restrictive alternatives will
sometimes blend into “lenience-related” arguments of the sort we considered in the
previous Section. See supra Section IV.D. Rather than defend its failure to regulate more
restrictively by citing the independent unconstitutionality of a more restrictive alternative,
the government might defend the less restrictive law as advancing a supplemental interest
in avoiding the imposition of constitutional harms on non-regulated parties. That is to say,
the constitutional defects of a more restrictive alternative might highlight not just the legal
impossibility of pursuing a government interest in a nondiscriminatory fashion but also a
valid and sufficiently strong lenience interest in sparing regulated parties from excess
constitutional harm. Cf. Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1669 (2015)
(suggesting that by avoiding the more restrictive alternative of a content-neutral ban on
judicial fundraising, a Florida law helped to advance the government interest in
“respect[ing] the First Amendment interests of candidates”).
281. See supra notes 149–56 and accompanying text.
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An answer to this question becomes apparent if the sinceritybased argument is understood to operate as a backward-looking claim
about legislative motive. Understood in this way, the role of the more
restrictive means is not so much to highlight alternative means of
future regulation as it is to raise doubts about the reasons for which
the government regulated in the past. And where the more restrictive
means functions in this way, its own present-day unconstitutionality
need not undermine its own doctrinal force. Consider again the
example of Roe: even if an exception-less abortion prohibition would
have faltered under the logic of Roe itself, its hypothetical availability
to the Texas legislature still reveals something about the factual and
normative premises that Texas legislators embraced when they
enacted the less restrictive measure that the Court struck down. In
short, a more restrictive means that is obviously unconstitutional
today can still shed light on the reasons for which the government
acted yesterday. And those reasons, in turn, can provide a basis for
invalidating the less restrictive law under review.
That is not to say that the constitutional validity (or lack thereof)
of a more restrictive alternative is necessarily irrelevant to a
backwards-looking determination about improper government
motives. The greater the constitutional defectiveness of a more
restrictive alternative, the easier it becomes for the government to
attribute its past non-enactment to something other than a lack of
regulatory seriousness. “Yes,” government actors might say, “we
know that the particular regulatory alternative you have identified
would have served our interests much more effectively, but we also
knew that it would never have stood a chance of being upheld in
court. So, rather than underscoring our lack of commitment to a
particular regulatory objective, the more restrictive means simply
reflects our reluctant bow to the realities of operative constitutional
doctrine.” Constitutional invalidity, that is, might offer a valid excuse
for the government’s failure to adopt even the most effective of
regulatory measures, thus defeating any inference that the
government sought to pursue some other set of illegitimate interests
when it put the less restrictive law into effect.
Consider in this respect the Court’s opinion in Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Association,282 which, in striking down
California’s prohibition on violent video games, characterized the
law’s “wildly underinclusive” nature as a critical constitutional

282. 564 U.S. 786, 802 (2011).
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defect.283 California had invoked an interest in promoting the
wellbeing of children, citing concerns that the early exposure to video
games would lead to the development of violent behavioral
tendencies in many of its citizens.284 But, as the majority observed,
children in California remained exposed to other depictions of
violence that were equally likely to cause that same harm.285 From
there the Court went on to explain:
Of course, California has (wisely) declined to restrict Saturday
morning cartoons, the sale of games rated for young children,
or the distribution of pictures of guns. The consequence is that
its regulation is wildly underinclusive when judged against its
asserted justification, which in our view is alone enough to
defeat it. Underinclusiveness raises serious doubts about
whether the government is in fact pursuing the interest it
invokes, rather than disfavoring a particular speaker or
viewpoint. Here, California has singled out the purveyors of
video games for disfavored treatment—at least when compared
to booksellers, cartoonists, and movie producers—and has
given no persuasive reason why.286
The Court in Brown thus pointed to California’s failure to adopt
a more restrictive means as indicative of government insincerity,
while simultaneously characterizing as wise that same failure to
regulate more restrictively. But the narrowness of California’s antiviolence measure was wise precisely because the more restrictive
means envisioned by the Court would itself almost certainly have
been struck down. So, rather than reveal a nefarious government
attempt to suppress a disfavored set of viewpoints, the underinclusive
scope of the California law might simply have reflected a
straightforward legal judgment by the state about what sorts of
materials the First Amendment did not (yet) prohibit it from
regulating. In accusing California lawmakers of regulatory insincerity,
the Court in Brown never considered the possibility that California’s
decision not to restrict minors’ access to more traditional media
stemmed from a bona fide attempt to comport with then-existent
First Amendment principles.
So how can we tell whether an obviously more restrictive
alternative is capable of supporting a backwards-looking inference
283. Id. at 791–92.
284. Id. at 800–01.
285. Id. at 801–02.
286. Id. (citing City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 51 (1994); Fla. Star v. B.S.F., 491
U.S. 524, 540 (1989)).
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about government motives? The relevant distinction must be one of
timing. The Court’s more restrictive means analysis in Brown was
questionable because the pre-Brown case law already cast doubt on
the constitutionality of prohibiting minors from purchasing movies,
books, and photographs. And the availability of such a benign
explanation for the law’s underinclusiveness thus undercut the
Court’s accusations of government insincerity. The same point might
not be true, however, when the constitutional defects of a more
restrictive means stem from doctrinal developments that postdate the
government’s decision to regulate less restrictively. In Roe, for
instance, Texas would have had more trouble attributing the noncategorical nature of its abortion to ban to a desire to stay within
then-existing constitutional limits. Texas’s ban had gone into effect
well before the Court had restricted a state’s ability to prohibit any
abortions, much less medically necessary abortions.287 The more
restrictive means, in other words, might have been obviously
unconstitutional according to Roe itself, but it would not have been
obviously (or even remotely) unconstitutional according to the norms
that prevailed when the state registered its decision not to prohibit
abortions categorically. Thus, whereas California in Brown might
plausibly have attributed the relative lenience of its law to an external
legal constraint over which it had no control, Texas in Roe could not
have done the same.
CONCLUSION
Where does all this leave us? My thesis, in short, has been that
“more restrictive means” analysis constitutes a real and analytically
valid method of constitutional decision-making, which derives
naturally from the Court’s longstanding emphasis on formal equality
and government sincerity as values of constitutional importance. It
remains to be asked whether these values should, in fact, matter as
much as they do, and that is not a question that this Article purports
to answer. But I hope to have demonstrated that, if constitutional
doctrine embraces these values, the doctrine must also embrace at
least some forms of more restrictive means analysis as well. One can
question the wisdom of treating a law’s relative lenience as a
constitutional liability, just as one can defend the centrality of
equality- and/or sincerity-related values within a range of different
287. According to the Court in Roe, Texas’s first abortion prohibition was enacted in
1854 and “was soon modified into language that has remained substantially unchanged to
the present time.” 410 U.S. 113, 119 (1973). Subsequent versions of the law, according to
the Court in Roe, exempted abortions necessary to save the life of the mother. Id.
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doctrines. But one cannot easily do both of these things at the same
time.
I also hope to have shown that embracing more restrictive means
analysis does not mean resigning oneself to a regime of everescalating restrictiveness. The equality-based and sincerity-based
arguments should not always succeed, as governments have at their
disposal several different means of contesting the claim that they
could have or should have pursued their interests in a more restrictive
fashion. Some of these defenses, to be sure, can implicate difficult
judgment calls. It will not always be easy to determine, for instance,
whether a failure to produce additional regulatory benefits should
count against a more restrictive law,288 whether a particular leniencerelated interest qualifies as important enough to justify a refusal to
regulate more restrictively,289 whether a set of enforcement-related
concerns amounts to more than just a complaint about administrative
convenience,290 whether a posited more restrictive alternative would
itself run afoul of the Constitution (and, if so, the extent to which that
fact should matter),291 and so forth. These and other questions will
often prove difficult to answer, and no amount of abstract theorizing
can likely change that fact. Even so, I do believe that by confronting
these sorts of questions directly and on their own terms, courts can
more clearly and cogently identify those circumstances in which more
restrictive alternatives should make a constitutional difference.

288.
289.
290.
291.

See supra Section IV.A.
See supra Section IV.D.
See supra Section IV.B.
See supra Part V.

